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ABSTRACT 
Through the 1990s, the United States military, specifically the Army, has 
decreased its forward presence around the world. Instead, we have become a "force 
projection" Army, relying on deployments to move our forces into a theater of 
operations. This increased reliance on the art of deploying has made the study of 
previous deployments critical. This study is also important since military strategists 
expect U.S. forces to be involved in an increasing number of regional contingency 
operations of the sort conducted in Bosnia from late 1995 until the present. The success 
of such large-scale operational missions hinges on the Army's ability to efficiently 
deploy its forces. Planners of future missions therefore would greatly benefit from the 
study of the deployment to Bosnia in support of Operation Joint Endeavor. 
This thesis provides a thorough chronology of events surrounding the 
deployment of Army forces from Germany through Hungary and Croatia into Bosnia. 
The work further analyzes related transportation and logistical issues and problems in 
order to identify lessons learned from the mission. 
Once the lessons learned are identified, the study relates how those lessons 
learned have influenced deployment doctrine and deployments to subsequent operations. 
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I.       INTRODUCTION 
The following is a case study of the United States Army, Europe (USAREUR) 
deployment and force sustainment operations that occurred in support of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention in Bosnia. The mission that the U.S. 
Army participated in was termed Operation Joint Endeavor (OJE) and military forces 
deployed from Germany to locations in Hungary, Croatia, and Bosnia between December 
1995 and February 1996. The purpose of this thesis is to thoroughly analyze deployment 
plans, decisions and actions of participating units and commanders. A comprehensive 
chronology of significant events relating to the deployment is provided. Attention 
focuses on the development and resolution of training, transportation, movement control 
and material handling problems from the perspective of the deployed USAREUR units. 
Such analysis is intended to identify lessons learned and produce recommendations 
useful in conducting similar future deployments. 
This chapter provides a brief history of the Bosnia operation and establishes the 
significance of studying it from a transporter's perspective. It further discusses the scope, 
method and intended application of the study. 
A.       BACKGROUND:        THE    BOSNIA    POLITICAL    AND    MILITARY 
CONTEXT 
In order to properly evaluate the deployment to Bosnia in support of Operation 
Joint Endeavor, it is important to first understand the political and military context in 
which it occurred. Basic knowledge of the history surrounding first United Nations (UN) 
and later NATO and U.S. involvement in Bosnia is therefore required.   Such historical 
1 
background  demonstrates  how  careful  analysis  of the  deployment to  Bosnia  is 
particularly significant. 
The crisis that compelled first the United Nations and later NATO and the United 
States to intervene in the Balkans might well have been predicted as early as 1918 when 
Yugoslavia was formed. It was created from a patchwork of Balkan states and territories 
that included Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H), Croatia-Slavonia and 
Dalmatia, all of which were previously administered by other countries. This loose 
association of states was established originally as a monarchy, but was later shifted to a 
dictatorship. With the combination of so many different states and territories, ethnic and 
religious conflict were rampant in Yugoslavia until World War II. During World War II, 
Josip Broz Tito and his partisans fought against the Nazis and supported the views of the 
Soviet Union. After the war, Tito won election in Yugoslavia as Prime Minister and 
adopted a Stalinist approach to ruling the country. Tito ruled Yugoslavia with an iron fist 
and eliminated any opposition to his leadership. This authoritarian rule also ensured that 
any ethnic or religious problems that erupted in the many areas of Yugoslavia were 
squashed immediately. Therefore, the various ethnic groups lived together and tolerated 
each other from fear of Tito's wrath. 
However, this would all change in 1980 after Tito's death. A rotational 
presidency was established in an attempt to divert a clash between Yugoslavia's multiple 
nationalities and regions (Yugoslavia, 2000). However, it was only a matter of time 
before the various ethnic groups began to tout their majority and lay claims to the 
leadership of the country. The rotational presidency managed to remain effective until 
1989 when a democratic revolution began to sweep through Eastern Europe. In 1989, the 
2 
Berlin Wall came down and the Soviet Union began to loosen its hold on Eastern Europe. 
East and West Germany reunified in 1990 and the Warsaw Pact began to disintegrate, 
allowing the nations of Eastern Europe to throw off the Russian yoke. By late 1990, the 
Balkan nations were free once again, but this freedom would come at a price. All the 
ethnic rivalries that had been submerged in Yugoslavia now started bubbling to the 
surface. These troubles would lead to civil wars and ethnic conflicts that would 
ultimately lead to UN and NATO involvement. 
When Communism and the Soviet Union collapsed, the Yugoslav federation of 
six republics that was formed in 1918 began to collapse also. As Figure 1 shows, 
Yugoslavia would eventually split into six republics and two autonomous provinces. 
Former Yugoslavia 
<t ;**oc«rx> -,-» 
Figure 1. Map of the Division of the Former Yugoslavia [From The Perry- 
Castaneda Library Map Collection] 
Free elections were held in many republics and independence-minded governments were 
elected. In June 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence from 
Yugoslavia. But these declarations caused border disputes between Serbia and both 
Slovenia and Croatia. Belgrade, the capital of Serbia, proclaimed that it would seek to 
change republican borders in an attempt to allow all Serbs to live in one state. Since both 
Slovenia and Croatia had small Serbian minorities, Belgrade would order Yugoslav Army 
troops, which were predominantly ethnic Serbs, to invade Croatia in what was the 
beginning of fighting in the Balkans. 
Between June and December 1991, Yugoslav Army forces, aided by Bosnian 
Serb forces, would capture almost one third of Croatia's territory and would also begin 
their campaign of "ethnic cleansing." committing atrocities unseen in Europe since World 
War II. During that time, the European Union (EU) would broker at least four different 
cease-fire agreements, none of which held. As a result of this, the United Nations 
became involved for the first time by passing UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 
713 on 25 September 1991, which imposed a general and complete arms embargo on all 
deliveries of weapons and military equipment to former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) 
countries. The UN would be continuously involved over the next four years to attempt to 
bring a peaceful resolution to the fighting and unrest in the Balkans. Table 1 shows the 
many United Nations Security Resolutions that were passed relating to the Balkans. 
Date of Resolution 
25 September 1991 






Imposes general/complete arms embargo on 
weapons and military equipment to former 
Republic of Yugoslavia countries. 
Notes conditions do not yet exist in 
Yugoslavia for the establishment of 
peacekeeping operations. 
8 January 1992 727 Endorses UN Secretary-General's intention 
to send 50 military liaison officers to 
monitor cease-fire. 
21 February 1992 743 Authorizes the establishment of a UN 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) as an 
interim arrangement to create the conditions 
of peace and security required for the 
negotiation of an overall settlement of the 
Yugoslav crisis. 
7 April 1992 749 Authorizes the deployment of the 
UNPROFOR to Croatia and Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. 
30 May 1992 757 Imposes very stringent mandatory economic 
sanctions on Yugoslavia (Serbia) for 
supporting the Serb rebels in B-H. 
29 June 1992 761 Authorizes humanitarian assistance 
(Operation Provide Promise) for B-H under 
the auspices of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 
13 August 1992 771 Condemns the practice of ethnic cleansing. 
9 October 1992 781 Establishes a ban on military flights in the 
airspace of B-H. 
11 December 1992 795 Authorizes the expansion of UNPROFOR 
into the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM) to monitor its borders 
with Albania and the FRY. 
31 March 1993 816 Authorizes member states to take all 
necessary measures to enforce the no-fly 
zone over B-H. 
6 May 1993 824 Establishes six "safe areas" in B-H 
(Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac, and 
Srebrenica) and places them under UN 
protection. 
4 June 1993 836 Authorizes the UNPROFOR to use force to 
protect the six UN-designated "safe areas". 
31 March 1995 981 Establishes the UN Confidence Restoration 
Organization (UNCRO) in Croatia to 
replace the UNPROFOR there. 
15 December 1995 1031 Requires implementation of the Peace 
Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
transfer of authority from the UN Protection 
Force to the multinational Implementation 
Force (IFOR). 
Table 1. United Nations Security Council Resolutions Relating to Yugoslavia. 
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In September 1991, Macedonia declared its independence from Yugoslavia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina follows in March 1992. The independence of Bosnia again causes 
the Serbian government to commit troops to ensure that all Serbians can live in one state. 
Although ethnic Serbians make up only about 31% of B-H, Serbian and Bosnian Serb 
Army forces seized upwards of 70% of the country (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2000). 
Upon seizure of this land, the military employed the same "ethnic cleansing" tactics as 
they did in Croatia, a systematic elimination, either by forcible expulsion or murder, of 
any non-Serb in that area. Since the majority of the people affected by this "ethnic 
cleansing" were either Croat, 17% of the population, or Muslim, 44% of the population, 
these two groups formed a loose alliance and began to retaliate against Serbs living in 
Muslim or Croat controlled areas. Although this retaliation was neither on the same scale 
or as severe as the Serbian's "ethnic cleansing" campaign, it nonetheless forced Serbs to 
leave their homes and contributed to the refugee problems in that country (Jahn, 1995). 
Because of the fighting in both Croatia and Bosnia, the UN Secretary General 
Boutros Boutros Ghali decided to send military liaisons to Bosnia in January 1992. The 
50 liaisons were supposed to monitor a cease-fire agreement that had been orchestrated 
by UN representative Cyrus Vance. While the cease-fire was in place, the UN received a 
request from the Yugoslavian government to establish some type of organization to 
"create conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall 
settlement of the Yugoslav crisis" (UNSCR 743, 1992). The organization created in 
response to the Yugoslavian request was called the United Nations Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR). UNPROFOR would ultimately operate for almost three and a half years 
and prove to be relatively ineffective at accomplishing its mission of settling the crisis in 
Yugoslavia. 
The cease-fire agreed to in January lasted only three months and fighting resumed 
after B-H declared its independence from Yugoslavia in early April 1992. During April 
and May 1992, Serb and Bosnian Serb forces each launched attacks throughout Bosnia, 
the most significant being the siege of Sarajevo. The siege on Sarajevo caused the United 
Nations to finally authorize full deployment of the UNPROFOR into locations in Croatia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM). In June 1992, another UNSCR authorized humanitarian 
assistance to B-H under the control of the United Nations High Commissioner on 
Refugees (UNHCR). This humanitarian assistance operation would be the United States' 
first direct involvement in the situation in Bosnia by flying relief supplies into Bosnia, 
particularly the city of Sarajevo. The mission would be called Operation Provide 
Promise and would bring the first United States Army, Europe units into the fold. The 
212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) deployed to Zagreb, Croatia, in November 
1992 to provide medical support for Operation Provide Promise and the UNPROFOR 
(Kirkpatrick, 2001). Also in support of Operation Provide Promise, the UN established a 
ban on military flights in B-H airspace in order to protect relief flights in that area. This 
ban largely was ignored by the Serbian controlled military and eventually led to NATO 
initiating Operation Deny Flight to enforce the no-fly zone. 
In December 1992, the UNPROFOR experienced its first mission creep, when its 
mandate was expanded to include monitoring the Macedonian borders with Albania and 
Serbia (UNSCR 795, 1992).   The UN deployed its first troops, a Nordic battalion, to 
7 
Macedonia in February 1993. Later in the year, the first battalion task force of 
USAREUR soldiers would deploy to Macedonia to support the UNPROFOR there. This 
task force was called Task Force Able Sentry (TFAS) and would maintain a presence in 
the area until just prior to the USAREUR deployment to Kosovo in 1999. In March 
1993, the loose alliance between Bosnian Croats and Muslims collapsed and fighting 
broke out for the first time between these groups. Because of this new fighting, the 
refugee problem in the Croat and Muslim controlled areas of Bosnia exploded. In order 
to curb the refugee problem, the United Nations established six "safe areas" inside 
Bosnia, cities where refugees could go to avoid persecution. The cities designated as 
"safe areas" were Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac, and Srebrenica (UNSCR 824, 
1993). In May 1993, UNPROFOR's mission expanded once again, this time to 
monitoring the "safe areas" and using force, if necessary, to protect them. 
Because of continuous fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO offered its 
assistance to the UN in order to protect UNPROFOR. The assistance was mainly in the 
form of air strikes against Serbian targets around Sarajevo. On 5 February 1994, a 
Bosnian Serb shell hit a Sarajevo market, killing 68 civilians (Jahn, 1995). This brought 
the first threats of NATO air strikes directly to the Serbs. Two months later, when 
Bosnia Serbs began shelling the "safe area" of Gorazde, NATO launched air strikes 
against Serbian targets out the city. Then in August 1994, NATO began a limited 
bombing campaign against Bosnia Serb targets that were threatening the security of 
UNPROFOR. 
In early 1995, former President Jimmy Carter, after intensive shuttle diplomacy, 
organized a four-month cease-fire, which did not hold.   In March 1995, fighting again 
8 
broke out in northeastern B-H. In May, fighting resumed in Croatia, where Croatian 
Army troops launched an offensive to regain territory lost to the Bosnian Serbs in 1991. 
This increased tensions on the border between Bosnia and Croatia and Bosnia Serbs 
retaliated. The situation in B-H was now beginning to steadily escalate. Because of 
continuing air strikes, the Bosnian Serbs intensified their attacks on five of the UN "safe 
areas." In addition, Bosnian Serb forces took more than 350 UN peacekeepers hostage 
and used some of these soldiers as human shields to protect ammunition dumps from 
NATO bombing. Throughout the months of May and June 1993, Bosnian Serb leaders 
refused to release UN prisoners without a guarantee that the NATO bombings would 
cease. Finally, President Bill Clinton offered American ground forces to extract the 
UNPROFOR, if necessary. This prompted the Bosnian Serbs to release all but 26 UN 
peacekeepers. Fighting continued to escalate in July and August 1995, Croatian forces 
regained substantial lost territory, the "safe area" of Srebrenica was overrun and another 
Bosnian Serb shell hit a Sarajevo market, killing 37. With this bombing, NATO initiated 
Operation Deliberate Force, which included air strikes against Bosnian Serb military 
targets. Realizing that they could not survive against NATO air strikes, the Bosnia Serbs 
agreed to move their heavy weapons back from Sarajevo and come to the negotiating 
table. In early October, all sides agreed to meet to discuss a peace plan developed by the 
United States. On 31 October 1995, representatives from Serbia, Croatia and B-H met 
outside of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio. After almost a month of 
negotiations, an agreement was reached and on 21 November 1995, the presidents of 
Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina initialed the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). 
This agreement would start the ball rolling as first NATO and then President Clinton 
authorized the deployment of forces in support of the Implementation Force (IFOR) 
necessary to implement the Dayton Peace Agreement. The final piece of the puzzle 
necessary to authorize the full deployment of NATO and USAREUR troops was 
completed on 14 December 1995 when the leaders formally signed the agreement in 
Paris, France. Operation Joint Endeavor had begun. 
B.        SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
A thorough study of deployment operations during Operation Joint Endeavor is 
important because occasions to conduct similar operations under similar circumstances 
are likely to be more frequent. With the demise of the Soviet Union and subsequent end 
of the cold war, a consensus has emerged among military strategists: (1) that U.S. forces 
should be prepared for "low-intensity engagements" and "operations other than war" and 
(2) that operations in the world's underdeveloped regions will grow in frequency and 
importance. These predictions are prominently reflected in the President's National 
Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy of the United States produced by the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. The desperate conditions in Bosnia appear to support the 
predictions. It is an archetypical case that strategists envision in the post-Cold war era: a 
Third World political crisis requiring multinational intervention to suppress hostilities 
and provide humanitarian assistance. Operation Joint Endeavor is therefore a convenient 
model, the analysis of which may be applied recurrently in similar operations. 
The Operation Joint Endeavor deployment should be especially well scrutinized. 
The demands on U.S. armed forces created by the new global political environment 
imply greater reliance on deployments to project and sustain U.S. power abroad. 
Diminished U.S. presence overseas intensifies this reliance. Operation Joint Endeavor is 
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a case in point, foreshadowing an expanded role for U.S. deployments. Strategic 
planners, therefore, should have some insight into the operation from a transportation 
perspective. 
This thesis serves to fill a gap in the analysis of the Operation Joint Endeavor 
deployment. Literature concerning the diplomatic and tactical dimensions of the mission 
in Bosnia is extensive. Unfortunately, however, considerably less attention has been paid 
to the transportation and logistical aspects of an expedition largely dependent on effective 
deployment. Although several units involved in the mission have published individual 
After Action Reviews (AAR), there is no comprehensive AAR specifically dealing with 
the deployment. Given the importance of the deployment during this operation and 
future U.S. military strategy, a history of this mission from a transportation and logistics 
perspective is required. 
C.       RESEARCH SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This case study is confined primarily to United States Army, Europe operations 
during the Operation Joint Endeavor deployment from December 1995 to February 1996. 
However, some attention is also paid to the movement of sustainment supplies 
immediately following the deployment period. Particular emphasis is placed on the 
decisions and activities of local commanders. The activities of other units are discussed 
as they relate to deployment or sustainment operations. 
The thesis details the events in the deployment cycle including actions taken in 
Germany, the Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) in Hungary and the Tactical Assembly 
Area (TAA) in Croatia. It does this in order to appraise the decisions of local Army 
commanders as well as USAREUR plans and policy. This includes the following: 
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1. The identification of key players within USAREUR and their respective 
roles in planning and managing the deployment (Chapter II); 
2. A description of relationships between USAREUR and units with stakes in 
the deployment, particularly other logistics commands (Chapter II); 
3. A complete chronology of significant events impacting deployment 
operations during Operation Joint Endeavor (Chapter II); 
4. An analysis of important issues affecting the deployment and sustainment 
of USAREUR soldiers including problems with planning, training, asset 
availability, movement control and logistical support (Chapter III); 
5. An assessment of the effectiveness of deployment and sustainment 
operations and how well logistical problems were solved (Chapter III); 
6. The identification of lessons learned about the conduct of deployment and 
sustainment operations (Chapter IV); 
7. A set of recommendations applicable to operations similar to the one 
conducted in support of Operation Joint Endeavor (Chapter IV); 
8. A discussion of how these lessons learned have influenced USAREUR 
and U.S. Army deployment doctrine and subsequent deployments 
(Chapter IV). 
Based on the experiences of local commanders, the thesis draws conclusions about 
broader transportation management issues. 
Research data about the deployment to Bosnia was gathered from the following 
sources: 
1. Published studies and accounts including documents from the General 
Accounting Office (GAO), the Army War College, the Center for Army 
Lessons Learned (CALL) and the V Corps Historian. 
2. Internet sources including the United States Army, Europe Lessons 
Learned Website. 
3. Current Army deployment doctrine as well as USAREUR deployment 
policies and procedures. 
4. Personal experience and interviews with Army officers who participated 
in the deployment. 
Thesis conclusions represent some of the opinions advanced by these sources. 
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D.       RESEARCH APPLICATION 
U.S. Army transportation and deployment planners are the intended beneficiaries 
of this study. These planners may be able to apply the lessons learned and 
recommendations from this thesis in order to improve future deployment operations 
similar to Operation Joint Endeavor. By recording the successes and failures of the U.S. 
Army in Bosnia, the nation may be able to more effectively project its influence in 
response to an environment of increasing global uncertainty. 
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II.     CHRONOLOGY OF THE OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR 
DEPLOYMENT 
A proper understanding of the deployment in support of Operation Joint Endeavor 
requires knowledge of the pertinent events surrounding the operation. This chapter 
therefore provides a thorough chronology of the deployment beginning with the earliest 
plans for a possible intervention into Bosnia and ending with the completion of the 
deployment of the 1st Armored Division (IAD). The chapter also briefly addresses key 
events occurring during the period of sustainment operations immediately following the 
completion of the deployment, as well as planning for the redeployment of IAD. Key 
decision makers and the roles of their respective commands are introduced in the course 
of the account. The chronology demonstrates the uniqueness of the operation and thus 
lays the groundwork for thoughtful discussion of the lessons learned from it. 
A.        PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 
Planning was the single most challenging aspect of OJE and brought home 
the basic truth that effective military planning on a tight schedule for a 
complex operation in a joint, coalition environment is not easy. The 
complexities of the proposed operation in B-H made the Who, What, 
When, Where, Why, and How of OJE difficult to pin down (USAREUR 
AAR Volume 1,1997, p. xii). 
As this quote indicates, the planning for Operation Joint Endeavor was very 
difficult. Part of the difficulty resulted from the uncertainty of the political situation in 
Bosnia and the outcome of peace negotiations. Another challenge resulted from NATO 
leading the planning effort and the resulting additional time for information to filter down 
through the multiple headquarters involved. Finally, OJE featured a compressed 
planning time line that forced parallel planning instead of the more formal, top down, 
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sequential planning familiar to Army planners. However, despite these difficulties, plans 
were developed at various headquarters and issued to their subordinate units. These plans 
and the efforts to produce them are discussed in this section. The first section will briefly 
cover the early planning, conducted between September 1991 and September 1995, for 
the operation by each headquarters involved. The discussion of planning conducted after 
September 1995 will be focused on the USAREUR level and below, including V Corps 
and 21st Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM). 
1. Early Planning (September 1991 to September 1995) 
Planning for potential peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia began in 
late 1991. Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) began work on the development 
of Operations Plan (OPLAN) 40103, which was NATO's joint plan for peace operations 
in the former Yugoslavia (USAREUR AAR Volume II, 1997, p. 147). The NATO plan 
included using the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and its subordinate units for any 
mission in Bosnia. One of the ARRC's subordinate units was the U.S. Army's 1st 
Armored Division, also a subordinate unit to V Corps and USAREUR. In addition to the 
IAD, there were also several other V Corps units that had a role in the ARRC and this 
would later prove beneficial in the planning arena. 
With the beginning of the development of OPLAN 40103, United States 
European Command (USEUCOM), USAREUR and V Corps began their planning in 
early 1992. The base document used by these staff planners was NATO OPLAN 4228, a 
peace implementation plan, and resulted in OPLANs 4228 at USEUCOM, USAREUR 
and V Corps headquarters (Kirkpatrick, 2001). These OPLANs continued in 
development and refinement at the various headquarters through  1993  and  1994. 
However, the planning during this timeframe was still at a very high level and not to a 
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very specific level of detail. The 1st Armored Division was the lowest level staff 
involved in any of the planning for this mission. 
However, the situation in Bosnia began to deteriorate in early 1994 with the 
Bosnian Serbs attacking Sarajevo and shelling the "safe area" of Gorazde. Planning for a 
possible ground mission in Bosnia was again renewed. When General George Joulwan 
assumed duties as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) he issued 
guidance to Admiral Jeremy Boorda, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern 
Europe (CINCSOUTH) to begin planning for the possibility of a short notice mission to 
extract the UNPROFOR from Bosnia (Kirkpatrick, 2001). This initiated planning on 
what would ultimately become AFSOUTH OPLAN 40104, the plan to extract 
UNPROFOR from Bosnia under hostile conditions. Again, this plan called for the use of 
the ARRC, which included the 1st Armored Division, which had been planning and 
training for a NATO contingency since 1992. 
When AFSOUTH issued a draft of OPLAN 40104 in January 1995, USAREUR 
began conceptual planning with IAD on their portion of the OPLAN. Up until that point 
however, there had never been a plan published lower than the AFSOUTH level. All the 
work was done at that level, with only bits and pieces passed down to subordinate 
headquarters to work issues. This caused some frustration among planners at the lower 
levels, particularly deployment and logistics planners who were never permitted to make 
any reconnaissance of the transportation and support infrastructure of the Balkans 
(Kirkpatrick, 2001). The lack of information led lower-level planners to make 
assumptions about information that would be critical during an actual deployment. One 
other fear crept into the minds of the lower level planners; a fear that the political events 
17 
in the Balkans might change so quickly that there would be inadequate time to prepare to 
properly deploy. 
As the fighting escalated in early 1995, the planning for an extraction of the 
UNPROFOR began to take shape, particularly in the personnel arena. The Joint Staff 
requested that EUCOM provide a task organization for the mission, which EUCOM 
passed to USAREUR. USAREUR responded saying it needed 24,000 soldiers to 
accomplish the mission. That strength was disapproved by EUCOM and a strength cap 
of 13,500 was established (Kirkpatrick, 2001). However, no rationale was provided as to 
why the reduction was necessary or what should be excluded. In response to the cap, 
USAREUR provided a task organization of 13,500 troops, along with a risk assessment 
of using this smaller force. Several days later, the cap was raised to 14,900, which 
coincided with the force size that IAD used in developing its plans (USAREUR AAR 
Volume II, 1997, p. 148). 
In May 1995, the situation in Bosnia significantly worsened and USAREUR 
began to work with AFSOUTH to develop a number of Quick Response Options (QRO) 
to supplement OPLAN 40104. These QROs consisted predominately of SETAF airborne 
troops combined with V Corps aviation assets to be commanded by the SETAF 
Commander, Major General Nix, and codenamed Task Force Lion. SETAF planners 
finalized their Operations Order (OPORD) in June 1995 and were almost employed a 
month later. 
In response to the continued Bosnian Serb harassment of the "safe areas" set up 
by the United Nations, NATO was poised to launch Task Force Lion. However, the 
Croatian-Muslim counter-offensive in August 1995 negated the necessity for using the 
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QRO. Around that same time, USAREUR was tasked by EUCOM to develop a concept 
for the implementation of a peacekeeping force in Bosnia. That requirement was further 
passed to V Corps to develop a campaign plan for that mission. Throughout the months 
of August and September 1995, planning and training continued to focus on the use of 
OPLAN 40104, with the peace implementation planning taking second priority. 
However, there was planning occurring at various levels for the peace implementation 
mission. AFSOUTH produced OPLAN 40105, the ARRC produced OPLAN 47402 and 
the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) produced OPLAN 10405 (V 
Corps AAR, 1997). 
Based on these OPLANs, Lieutenant General (LTG) John Abrams, the V Corps 
Commander, decided that the peace implementation mission had a high likelihood of 
occurrence so he directed his staff to begin to focus its attention on that planning effort. 
That would begin the planning that would ultimately result in USAREUR OPLAN 4243, 
concerning Title 10 issues and USAREUR Campaign Plan 40105, concerning the 
employment of Task Force Eagle (TFE) (USAREUR AAR Volume I, 1997, p. 150). 
This planning would also lead to the imposition of the force cap for TFE. Although 
USAREUR analysis determined that approximately 38,000 soldiers would be required for 
the peace implementation mission, EUCOM would eventually reduce that number to 
20,000 (V Corps AAR, 1997). 
2.        Planning For Peace Implementation (October to December 1995) 
Despite the fact that planning for the peace implementation mission was being 
conducted at NATO, ARRC, AFSOUTH and EUCOM headquarters, the flow of 
information through and between those headquarters was painfully slow.  Also, because 
the political situation had yet to warrant a peace implementation mission, planning at the 
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higher headquarters progressed slowly. With this slow planning process at the higher 
levels and the lack of information regarding the planning effort, staffs at lower levels, 
particularly V Corps and USAREUR began pushing forward with their own plans. 
Starting at the end of September, a definite shift in the pace of planning was detected 
throughout USAREUR and V Corps. LTG Abrams felt that the order to deploy could 
come as early as 1 October and in the absence of a plan from higher headquarters, 
therefore urged his staff to develop a short notice plan to meet this possibility. 
Fortunately, this early notification never materialized, but spurred on by their 
commander's drive to ensure proper preparations for deployment, the V Corps and 
USAREUR staffs essentially entered a crisis action planning mode. This type of 
planning would be evident until the time the plan was executed. 
Not satisfied with the planning linkup between V Corps and the units that would 
be performing the logistics operations during the deployment, the 21st TAACOM 
commanded by Major General (MG) James M. Wright and the 3rd Corps Support 
Command (COSCOM) commanded by Brigadier General (BG) Samuel L. Kindred, LTG 
Abrams ordered a planning conference. At the outset of the conference, conducted from 
16-20 October 1995 at the Grafenwoehr Training Area, the TAACOM and the COSCOM 
were fully one month behind in planning for the peace implementation force. However, 
by the end of the planning conference, the staffs were totally synchronized and had 
developed the backbone of a clear, supportable plan. In addition, several crucial 
decisions or recommended solutions had been made. Probably the most critical 
recommendation made was to use Hungary as an Intermediate Staging Base, through 
which the entire TFE would deploy (V Corps AAR, 1997). 
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Sound transportation considerations made the selection of the area around 
Kaposvar and Taszar, Hungary the best choice for an ISB. It had the rail, air and road 
infrastructure that Belgrade, Serbia and Slovanski Brod, Croatia did not possess. 
Because the ISB would provide a platform for deploying units to be received into the area 
of operations (AO), staged during the validation process and then moved onward to the 
tactical assembly area for integration into the force moving into Bosnia, the 
transportation infrastructure was a must. While the transportation infrastructure was the 
primary reason Hungary was selected, several other factors were considered. Chief 
among them was the fact that the ISB would be in a country that had not been involved in 
the fighting in Bosnia and therefore would made the priority of force protection much 
easier. The Intermediate Staging Base would prove to be a vital link in the success of the 
deployment to Bosnia in support of Operation Joint Endeavor. Figure 2 shows the 
location of the ISB. 
HB0EL8ERG, GE1071 KM 
FWD 
Approximately 3800 soldi« 
Figure 2. The Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) [From USAREUR AAR Volume I] 
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One key event that would have significant impact on the deployment also 
occurred independently of the Grafenwoehr planning conference. On 17 October, 
EUCOM ordered USAREUR to gather Level 2 Time Phased Force Deployment Data 
(TPFDD) in order to begin building the database that could be later used to direct the 
deployment. Level 2 data includes the total number of passengers by unit line number 
(ULN) and total short tons of cargo. Because of the planning that V Corps and the other 
organizations had accomplished at the Grafenwoehr planning conference, this 
information was fairly easy to obtain. 
By the time the planning conference was over, the governments of Serbia, Croatia 
and Bosnia had agreed to meet for peace talks. Those talks began on 31 October 1995 
outside Dayton, Ohio and further served to quicken the pace of planning for the 
deployment. As a result of these meetings, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
issued an alert order on 4 November 1995 directing execution planning to commence. 
With this, the planning at the higher levels began to catch up with the planning done at 
the USAREUR and V Corps levels. General Joulwan's SHAPE headquarters completed 
its OPLAN 10405, called Operation Joint Endeavor, on 15 November and on 24 
November, AFSOUTH submitted their support OPLAN 40105 (V Corps AAR, 1997). In 
the meantime, V Corps and USAREUR staffs had completed their campaign plan and 
began focusing on training and preparing for the deployment. 
When the negotiating parties initialed the peace agreement on 21 November 1995, 
several last minute changes needed to be made to all the OPLANs to ensure they 
supported the agreement. USAREUR planners refined the reception, staging, onward 
movement  and  integration   (RSOI)  plan  for  Hungary,   as   well   as  the   lines   of 
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communication (LOC), enabling force structure and the concept of their operations. It 
was at this time that USAREUR also ordered the trains to accommodate the beginning of 
the deployment. Finally, during this time, President Clinton was briefed on the IFOR 
mission and issued an execution order to deploy the enabling forces on 2 December 1995. 
The deployment had begun. 
3.        Concept of Operations 
The Joint Endeavor concept envisioned a single US division organized 
with multiple brigades, numerous corps-level support units directly under 
division control, and a US Army Europe forward headquarters as the 
national support element in Hungary and Croatia. The first phase of the 
deployment of US forces from garrisons in Germany called for 
establishing a forward headquarters for US Army Europe in Hungary. The 
commander then expected to deploy engineer and combat units from 
Hungary to establish lines of communication and bases in Bosnia. 
Thereafter the bulk of the force would complete deployment to that area 
(Fontaine, 1997, p. 52). 
SACEUR, General Joulwan, envisioned this exact type of deployment when he 
published SHAPE OPLAN 10405. The OPLAN called for a five-phase operation with 
two deploying forces. The five phases were: Phase I, Preparation and deployment of 
theater enabling forces; Phase II, Entry; Phase III, Implementation; Phase IV, Transition 
to Peace and Phase V, Exit. The two deploying forces were the enabling force, 
mentioned in Phase I and the implementing force, to deploy in Phase II. The enabling 
force was to provide command and control, reception, a force to take the transfer of 
authority (TOA) from the UNPROFOR and support for the deployment of the 
implementing force (Crawley, 1995, p. 3). The implementing force would enforce the 
zones of separation (ZOS) and establish an environment in which the terms of the Dayton 
Peace Accords could be carried out (V Corps AAR, 1997). The OPLAN also envisioned 
dividing Bosnia into three sectors or multinational divisions (MND).   MND Southwest 
23 
(SW) was under the command and control of the British, MND Southeast (SE) was under 
the control of the French and MND North (N) was under the control of Task Force Eagle. 
This thesis will only deal with the deployment of TFE. Figure 3 shows the area of 
operations and the division of Bosnia. 
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Figure 3.        Area of Operations and Military Division of Bosnia [From US AREUR 
AAR Volume I] 
The AFSOUTH and USEUCOM OPLANs mirrored the intent and concept of 
operations from the SHAPE OPLAN.    In addition to the five phases, each of the 
OPLANs also reinforced the commander's intent that security and force protection were a 
top priority in this deployment. The EUCOM OPLAN had an additional assumption that 
would almost cause significant disruption in the deployment flow.   EUCOM assumed 
that NATO would handle the coordination for Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), 
transit agreements and host nation (HN) support agreements.   The transit agreement 
assumption was critical since the primary method of deployment for this operation would 
be rail and those trains would have to transit several sovereign countries enroute to 
Hungary. 
24 
The USAREUR OPLAN was much more specific in its concept of the operation. 
CINCUSAREUR supported the SACEUR's five phases and specifically laid out his five 
step methodology for supporting the plan. First, he intended to train and condition the 
force to deal with the cold weather, land mines, peace enforcement operations and the 
specific rules of engagement (ROE). Second, he was going to establish a power 
projection base in Hungary to rapidly introduce forces and maintain an uninterrupted 
flow of supplies. Third, he would integrate any UNPROFOR elements or other 
multinational units that were tasked to be part of the U.S. force. Fourth, he would 
support the force logistically from the Central Region logistical base. Finally, he 
intended to avoid the mission creep that would prevent his forces from exiting 
(USAREUR AAR Volume I, 1997, p. 36). 
In addition to the focused concept of operations, the USAREUR OPLAN laid out 
a deliberate timetable for a sequential deployment, triggered by the signing of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement in Paris. That day would officially become G-Day and was meant to 
signal the beginning of the deployment of the main body into Bosnia. The enabling force 
was scheduled to deploy fourteen days before G-Day on what was officially known as C- 
Day. The enabling force would contain the RSOI force and LOC opening force and 
would establish the ISB as a transportation hub and power projection base to control the 
deployment and later sustainment of Task Force Eagle. USAREUR would establish its 
headquarters in Hungary, officially called USAREUR (Forward), and later changed to the 
National Support Element (NSE). The TOA between UNPROFOR and IFOR, 
represented by the 3-325 Airborne Infantry, from Vicenza, Italy, also known as the Initial 
Entry Force, would happen on G + 5, also designated as D-Day. Then the LOC opening 
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force would deploy to build a bridge across the Sava River. Once the bridge was 
completed, Task Force Eagle would relieve the Initial Entry Force and by D + 30, Task 
Force Eagle would control the ZOS. The graphic in Figure 4 shows the key days and 





G-Day G+5 = D+30 
DPA signed; DDay; IFOR 
Main Force TO A occurs controls 
Deploys ZOSs 
Figure 4. OPLAN Proposed Time Line [From V Corps AAR] 
In addition to this time line, the USAREUR OPLAN also established a D-Day schedule 
to coincide with the five phases of the operation from the SACEUR order. Phase I would 
last from D-19 until D-Day, Phase II from D-Day until D+29, Phase III from D+30 to 
D+90, Phase IV from D+91 to NLT D+365 and Phase V would be complete NLT D+365 
USAREUR AAR Volume 1, 1997, p. 38). 
4. Unit Preparation and Task Organization 
a. Training 
This section deals with pre-deployment training and preparation as well as 
the ultimate task organizations of the units deploying in support of Operation Joint 
Endeavor.   One of the many aspects of this mission that LTG Abrams emphasized was 
unit preparedness.  He forced his staff to plan well in advance of receiving information 
from his higher headquarters in order to allow subordinate units sufficient time to train 
and prepare for this mission.   He refused to accept the risks associated with deploying 
untrained or inexperienced troops.   The training program that his staff established was 
thorough and was designed to ensure, through validation, that each individual soldier and 
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unit was familiar with the mission, the area and the "enemy". This training program also 
included family orientations as well. "By the time the force was deployed, virtually 
every soldier, civilian, and family member in USAREUR had been exposed to special 
training or orientations related to OJE." (USAREUR AAR Volume I, p. 142) 
USAREUR created the Mountain Eagle training program, which was 
specifically designed to train the force to accomplish the mission set forth in the 
SACEUR OPLAN. The major training areas of Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels were the 
principal locations for conducting this training. The training consisted of a political- 
military (POL-MIL) seminar, two deployment exercises (DEPEX), two command post 
exercises (CPX), three fire coordination exercises (FCX) and a multi-event certification 
(mission rehearsal) exercise (USAREUR AAR Volume I, p. 145). These exercises, along 
with the five situational training exercise (STX) lanes that were established helped to 
train Task Force Eagle soldiers on the ZOS mission, terrorism, mine awareness, snipers, 
mass casualties, convoy escort, an embedded media, downed pilots, ethnic violence, 
handling refugees, the rules of engagement, negotiations, patrolling, and set up and 
execution of check points (V Corps AAR, 1997). All of these tasks were accomplished 
during two Mountain Eagle exercises between October and December 1995. Table 2 
shows the scheduling of the exercises and whom they trained. 
EXERCISE DATES UNIT TRAI1SED MISST0N 
MOUNTAIN 
EAGLE 
16  October - 22 
November 1995 
TFE and NSE forces IFOR Mission 
MOUNTAIN 
EAGLE II 
10-14    December 
1995 
TFE    (IAD    and    3 
Multinational Units) 
IFOR Mission 
Table 2. Operation Joint Endeavor Training Exercises [After V Corps AAR] 
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While the aforementioned training was significant for the warfighter, the 
missions those soldiers were being trained for could not be accomplished if the soldiers 
were unable to deploy to the area of operations. Therefore, USAREUR determined that it 
needed to conduct deployment training to ensure that forces were able to deploy to their 
respective AO. Another reason this training was necessary was that this deployment was 
different than any deployment that USAREUR had ever conducted. USAREUR's 
traditional deployment training involved moving units to their General Defense Positions 
(GDP) in the case of a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. This training also 
included receiving units from the continental United States (CONUS) who were returning 
to Germany to ward off the Eastern invaders. The deployment conducted by USAREUR 
units in support of Operation Desert Storm was essentially a reverse of previous 
deployment exercises. Instead of receiving CONUS troops at air and sea ports of 
debarkation (APOD/SPOD), the USAREUR soldier were deploying from those same 
familiar ports. So the Desert Storm deployment did not stretch the level of experience 
within USAREUR. Operation Joint Endeavor's deployment would be like nothing 
USAREUR had ever experienced. 
USAREUR held two deployment exercises prior to the actual Operation 
Joint Endeavor deployment. A third was scheduled, but was overcome by the actual 
deployment. The first deployment exercise, called DEPLOYEX, was held at the 
Grafenwoehr training area on 14-15 October 1995. Participants included the 21st 
TAACOM, 1st Theater Movement Control Agency (TMCA), 3rd COSCOM, 1st Armored 
Division and all USAREUR Area Support Groups (ASG) (USAREUR AAR Volume 1, 
1997, p. 163).    The DEPLOYEX was focused on deploying at the unit level and 
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addressed deployment procedures and processes. This was helpful since a valid 
deployment plan for this mission had still not been issued. Exercise participants also 
discussed the use of ASGs and their subordinate Base Support Battalions (BSB) as 
platforms for this deployment. It became clear very early that these units were not 
prepared for this mission. They lacked the staffing, resources, training, and 
documentation, including deployment standard operating procedures (SOP). It was also 
apparent that deployment SOPs were a problem throughout the command. One of the 
main requirements resulting from the DEPLOYEX was for units to update their 
deployment SOPs. 
The second deployment exercise, DEPEXII, was conducted 24 November 
at various headquarters and railhead locations throughout Germany. It consisted of two 
parts, an loading exercise (LOADEX), an abbreviated field training exercise to ensure 
railhead support proficiency from the BSBs and a computer simulation exercise (SIMEX) 
which simulated part of TFE deploying to the ISB. During this exercise, the various 
command and control headquarters involved monitored the exercise using the Standard 
Theater Army Command and Control System (STACCS). USAREUR designated and 
validated this system as the deployment tracking and reporting system for the Operation 
Joint Endeavor deployment. The exercise was a success and showed that the ASGs were 
prepared to handle the deployment. However, the exercise also identified several 
shortfalls with STACCS, including lack of trained operators, non-availability of STACCS 
operators and equipment, and lack of a STACCS SOP. The DEPEX II also identified the 
lack of a call forward process for initiating a unit deployment through the operations, 
support and transportation chains. 
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b.        Preparations 
In addition to the training conducted prior to Operation Joint Endeavor, 
units undertook numerous other tasks in order to prepare for deployment. The OPLANs 
published very specific guidelines for individual and unit pre-deployment activities. 
Personnel processing such as inoculations, wills, powers of attorney and dental checkups 
were accomplished at unit's home stations during soldier readiness processing (SRP). 
Other individual processing included ensuring deploying personnel had all their required 
organizational clothing and individual equipment (OCIE). This was especially important 
and monitored closely by headquarters at all levels because of the timeframe of the 
deployment. LTG Abrams had issued guidance that cold weather injuries would not be 
tolerated, so the chain of command ensured every soldier had their extreme cold weather 
issue from the Central Issue Facility (CIF). Married soldiers were provided time to spend 
with their families to ease the burden of separation. Single soldiers coordinated for 
storage of personal belongings and privately owned vehicles (POV). This was a very 
busy time for all deploying soldiers. 
Unit preparations included packing containers and vehicles in preparation 
for deployment. Vehicle maintenance and inspections were conducted to ensure proper 
vehicle operation. Supplies were ordered and packed to ensure soldiers were supported 
during the deployment and before the support infrastructure was established in theater. 
Family briefings were held to inform spouses and children of the upcoming mission. 
Vehicles were weighed and marked for air transportation or prepared for rail movement. 
A myriad of other pre-deployment tasks were accomplished during this time, which was 
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extremely hectic. Unit commanders also had to ensure a balance of time to accomplish 
both unit and individual preparations. 
c. Task Organization 
Operation Joint Endeavor was the most complex operational command 
and control challenge for the U.S. Army in Europe since World War II. Command 
relationships were, however, based on long-standing command and control relationships 
in Europe and NATO. USAREUR would serve as a force provider for both 
CINCSOUTH, who was acting as Commander, Implementation Force (COMIFOR) and 
the NATO Land Component Commander, Commander, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps 
(COMARRC) (USAREUR AAR Volume I, 1997, p. 48). These organizations would 
have operational control (OPCON) of the 1st Armored Division and their associated 
elements, which made up Task Force Eagle. Figure 5 shows the command and control 
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Figure 5. Chain of Command for Operation Joint Endeavor [After USAREUR AAR 
Volume I] 
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In addition to this structure there was the structure of the units in the ISB. 
These units fell under the command and control of USAREUR (Forward) for the purpose 
of establishing a National Support Element to support deployed U.S. forces in the area of 
responsibility. This support included all logistical support as well as Title 10 support. 
USAREUR (Forward) was composed primarily of the 21st TAACOM (Forward) and also 
included the 7th Signal Brigade, 30th Medical Brigade, 1st Personnel Command 
(PERSCOM) and the 266th Finance Command. 
21st TAACOM (Forward) was made up primarily of staff from the 3rd 
COSCOM because the TAACOM did not have the structure necessary to deploy and still 
fulfill their extensive Central Region support mission. Therefore, 200 of the 251 soldiers 
assigned to the 3rd COSCOM staff deployed to Hungary to make up the 21st TAACOM. 
The Commander, 3rd COSCOM, BG Samuel L. Kindred was the Commander, 21st 
TAACOM (Forward). Figure 6 shows the USAREUR command and control relationship 
during Operation Joint Endeavor. 
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Figure 6.        USAREUR Command and Control During OJE [From USAREUR AAR 
Volume I] 
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Finally, the 1st Armored Division, commanded by Major General William 
L. Nash, formed the bulk of what would be Task Force Eagle and was made up of the 1st 
and 2nd Brigade Combat Teams (BCT), as well as the 4th Brigade, an aviation brigade. In 
addition to these units, IAD had the Division Support Command (DISCOM) with its four 
support battalions, an Engineer brigade, a Field Artillery (FA) brigade, a Military 
Intelligence (MI) battalion, a Signal battalion and an Air Defense (AD) battalion 
rounding out its task organization. The division also had several attached units, including 
the 16th Corps Support Group (CSG), part of the 30th Medical Brigade, part of the 22nd 
Signal Brigade, part of the 205th MI Brigade and part of the 18th Military Police (MP) 
Brigade. The total division strength for the deployment was around 19,900 soldiers (V 
Corps AAR, 1997). 
Table 3 shows the composition and strength of the 1st Brigade Combat 
Team. The 1st BCT was commanded by Colonel Gregory R. Fontenot. 
|,# Bfigäde Combat Team 
1st Brigade Headquarters 
th 3ra Battalion, 5m Cavalry 
4th Battalion, 67th Armor 
2nd Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery 
C Battery, 333 Target Acquisition Battery (TAB) 
,rd 23 a Engineer Battalion 
501st Forward Support Battalion (FSB) 
Combat Support (CS)/Combat Service Support (CSS) 
Total Strength: 2,516 
Table 3. 1st BCT Units and Strength [After USAREUR AAR Volume II] 
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Table 4 shows the 2nd Brigade Combat Team's composition and strength. The 2nd 
BCT was commanded by Colonel John R.S. Batiste. 
?Dd Brigade Combat Team 
2nd Brigade Headquarters 
4th Battalion, 12th Infantry 
2nd Battalion, 15th Infantry 
2nd Battalion, 68th Armor 
3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry 
4th Battalion, 29th Field Artillery 
B Battery, 25th TAB 
40   Engineer Battalion 
47th FSB 
CS/CSS 
Total Strength: 3,341 
■>nd Table 4. 2na BCT Units and Strength [After USAREUR AAR Volume II] 
Table 5 shows the 4th Brigade, which was envisioned as being a quick strike 
aviation brigade, if necessary. Colonel William L. Webb III commanded the 4th Brigade. 
4th Rric 4 .BrigadeStrike For-ce 5 . 
4th Brigade Headquarters 
>nd 7th 2nQ Battalion, 227m Attack Helicopter 
3rd Battalion, 1st Attack Helicopter 
7th- 7th 7m Battalion, 227in Assault Helicopter 
C Battery, 333 Target Acquisition Battery (TAB) 
A Company, 5th Battalion, 159th Medium Lift Hel 
rth 236   Medevac 
Total Strength: 1,173 
Table 5. ith 4m Brigade Units and Strength [After USAREUR AAR Volume II] 
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The final piece of the deploying 1st Armored Division was the follow on 
sustainment units. These are all the units attached to the division providing various types 
of support. Table 6 shows these units and their overall strengths. 
Follow On Sustainment Forces 
Divisional Artillery (A/94 MLRS Battery/TAB) 390 personnel 
18th MP Brigade 1221 personnel 
205th MI Brigade 918 total, 501 in B-H 
22nd Signal Brigade 1107 total, 1007 in B-H 
Engineer Brigade (-) 798 personnel 
Division Support Command 979 personnel 
16th Corps Support Group 1416 total, 1258 in B-H 
Division Troops 570 personnel 
30th Medical Brigade 640 personnel 
Total Strength: 8,039 
Table 6. Follow on Force Units and Strengths [After USAREUR AAR Volume II] 
5. Execution of Orders 
On 1 December 1995, NATO authorized the deployment of the IFOR enabling 
force and SHAPE sent its activation order (ACTORD) to AFSOUTH. On 2 December, 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued an execution order for the enabling force and 
EUCOM and USAREUR issued further guidance on personnel qualification standards for 
IFOR. On 3 December, President Clinton authorized the initial deployment of U.S. 
forces as part of IFOR and EUCOM issued its deployment alert order. Throughout the 
first several days of December, the chain of command issued a myriad of ACTORDs and 
execution orders (EXORD), as well as the approved OPLANs that the lower-level 
headquarters were anxiously awaiting.    On 7 December, the initial contingent of 
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USAREUR soldiers in the enabling forces departed Germany by C-130 and landed in 
Tuzla. This would be the beginning of the NATO presence in Bosnia that continues until 
the present day. On 12 December, Hungary approved the Status of Forces Agreement to 
provide assistance to the U.S., allowing the Army to use Kapsovar-Taszar as the ISB. 
The Dayton Peace Agreement was formally signed in Paris on 14 December 1995, which 
triggered a flow of EXORDs from the various headquarters aimed at beginning the main 
force deployment.    RSOI and LOC-opening force soldiers began to deploy almost 
immediately from Germany.    On 17 December 1995, SETAF deployed the 3-325 
Airborne Infantry from Italy to Tuzla.   The 3-325 in turn, conducted the transfer of 
authority from the UNPROFOR on 20 December.    Initial elements from the 502nd 
Engineer Company reached Zupanje, Croatia and began preparations for the pontoon 
bridge that would link the 1st Armored Division and Task Force Eagle to Bosnia.   The 
flow of the TFE could now begin. 
B.       DEPLOYMENT:       1ST   ARMORED   DIVISION   AND   SUPPORTING 
FORCES 
As previously mentioned, CINCUSAREUR, General Crouch, desired a steady 
and deliberate deployment of the seven force packages into the AO.    The concept 
envisioned the movement of troops from home station to the port of embarkation (POE), 
movement from the POE to POD, reception and staging activities in the ISB, onward 
movement to the tactical assembly area and integration of forces.  Because the majority 
of forces were from USAREUR, the flow would primarily come from Germany. 
However, because President Clinton had initiated a Presidential Selective Reserve Call- 
Up (PSRC), there would be Reserve Component forces flowing from CONUS as well. 
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Once the Reserve Component soldiers arrived in Germany, they would follow the same 
deployment procedure as the forces deploying from Germany. 
1.        Central Region Operations (Germany) 
In Germany, the USAREUR Headquarters was responsible for developing 
requirements and movement priorities, monitoring the flow of forces, coordinating 
changes to the flow and issuing call forward instructions. The 21st TAACOM, 
commanded by MG James Wright, was the executive agent for the deployment and relied 
heavily on 1st TMCA, commanded by COL Bruce Laferriere, for planning, coordinating 
and managing common user land transportation in Germany, as well as movement 
control and movement tracking during the deployment. The Area Support Groups in 
Germany and their subordinate Base Support Battalions , all under USAREUR command 
and control, were responsible for assisting deploying units at the ports of embarkation. 
The 1st Armored Division, the main deploying unit, was responsible for preparing 
soldiers and equipment for deployment, loading vehicles at the POE and verifying and 
validating the priorities set by USAREUR. 
Deployment execution for a unit began with a call forward to the railhead or 
APOE at Ramstein Air Base (AB) or Rhein-Main AB. The call forward started at 
USAREUR and went from there to the 21st TAACOM to the 1st TMCA, to a movement 
control team (MCT) to a branch movement control team (BMCT). The BMCT would 
pass the actual movement orders on to the unit. Of course, there was also an informal 
notification chain, but a unit was not allowed to load rail cars unless they had a valid 
movement order. 
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Because the deployment relied heavily on rail movements, 1st TMCA decided to 
use STACCS as its movement planning and command and control system. The TMCA 
was very familiar with STACCS and it lent itself easily to the use of NATO 
Standardization Agreements (STANAG), a requirement for requesting rail cars in 
Germany. The next several paragraphs will deal with various aspects of the deployment 
from Germany. 
a.        Area Support Groups/Base Support Battalions as "Launching 
Platforms" 
For the first time in a major contingency operation, ASGs and BSBs 
performed as deployment platforms for USAREUR units.  As previously discussed, no 
doctrine existed for this mission.    Therefore, USAREUR conducted two deployment 
exercises to ensure these "launching platforms" were prepared to conduct this mission. 
In performing this mission, the BSBs relieved deploying units of some of the burden of 
deploying and allowed them to focus on the mission. 
Throughout Germany, as the 1st Armored Division and their supporting 
units geared up to deploy, BSBs were organizing, training, ordering blocking, bracing 
and tiedown (BBT) materials, preparing safety briefings and obtaining safety equipment. 
Deploying units would coordinate ahead of time with the BSB on the date they were 
supposed to depart. Once the unit showed up at the railhead, the only task the unit 
performed was to provide equipment operators to drive the equipment onto the trains. 
BSB personnel and augmentees from non-deploying units formed a "power projection 
unit" that would ground guide all vehicles onto the train, secure the vehicles, and load 
containers onto the train (Allen Interview, 1996). 
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Because the deployment encompassed over 30 railheads in Germany, the 
ASGs and BSBs were extremely busy during the deployment.  The major player in the 
deployment was the 53rd Area Support Group, headquartered in Wiesbaden, with the 
subordinate 221st BSB in Wiesbaden, 222nd BSB in Baumholder and the 410th BSB in 
Bad Kreuznach. These BSBs controlled the communities where the 1st Armored Division 
was stationed as well as the Headquarters, 3rd COSCOM.  The 26th ASG, headquartered 
in Heidelberg, supported the communities of Heidelberg, with the 411th BSB; Mannheim, 
with the 293rd BSB and Kaiserslautern, with the 415th BSB. Heidelberg was the home of 
USAREUR and V Corps Headquarters, Mannheim was home to the 5th Signal Command 
and the 181st and 28th Transportation Battalions and Kaiserslautern was the home of the 
21st TAACOM, 1st TMCA, 37th Transportation Command and 29th Support Group. 
These two ASGs supported a significant portion of the soldiers deploying to Hungary and 
Bosnia. Another ASG that also played a key role in the deployment was the 104th ASG 
in Hanau.   Its subordinate BSBs, the 414th BSB in Hanau deployed the 1st Armored 
Division's 4th Brigade and the 16th Corps Support Group, the 284th BSB in Giessen 
deployed the 1st Armored Divisions 1st Brigade Combat Team and the 233rd BSB in 
Darmstadt deployed key signal and air defense units into the AO.  Two other ASGs of 
note are the 22nd ASG in Vicenza, Italy, which deployed SETAF as the initial entry force 
and the 100th ASG in Vilseck, Germany, which provided support to the convoy support 
center (CSC) in Regensberg, Germany. 
b. Standard   Theater   Army   Command   and   Control   System 
(STACCS) 
STACCS is one of the Army's many transportation automated systems 
used in deployments.   STACCS provides replicated databases with common situation 
39 
maps, communications, man-made interfaces, briefing systems, and commercial off-the- 
shelf software to theater commands and major subordinate commands. One of 
STACCS's modules allows for easy movement planning and the communications piece 
lends itself well to deployment tracking. In addition, all of TMCA's subordinate MCTs 
had STACCS and could see near real-time scheduling and movement information. This 
made it very easy for the entire movement control structure in Germany to be 
synchronized. 
For OJE, STACCS was the system selected by the 1st TMCA, a theater 
command, as the primary deployment and automated force-tracking system in theater. 
The main reason that STACCS was selected was familiarity. The 1st TMCA was more 
familiar with STACCS than they were with Transportation Coordinator's-Automated 
Command and Control Information System (TC-ACCIS) or the Joint Operation Planning 
and Execution System (JOPES). This decision would later prove to be one of the main 
sources of difficulty in developing a comprehensive and coherent deployment plan. 
c. NA TO Standardization Agreements (STANA G) 
As the acronym states, STANAGs are NATO Standardization 
Agreements. For the deployment from Germany to the Balkans, STANAGs would play 
an important role in the rail deployment, because in Germany, USAREUR uses 
STANAGs to request trains for movement and to determine proper tiedown of vehicles in 
transit. 
The first STANAG specifies a standard form that units use to request rail 
cars for deployment. The STANAG requires units to list their origination, destination, 
types of vehicles deploying, weights, and other measurements such as length, width and 
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height. Units, especially combat units, frequently use STANAGs to request support in 
moving their tracked vehicles to one of the major training areas within Germany. In 
addition, the use of STANAGs at the TMCA Headquarters was a daily occurrence. 
Because of this common use, USAREUR planners thought that it was not necessary to 
include the STANAG in predeployment training. This omission would prove detrimental 
at the beginning of the deployment. 
The second STANAG, STANAG 2173, lists standards for blocking, 
bracing and tiedown of equipment being transported by rail. This second agreement was 
widely used by the ASGs and BSBs who were responsible for securing vehicles at the 
railheads. However, this too would develop into a problem as the first trains departed 
Germany and moved into non-NATO countries. 
2.        Deployment Modes 
Figure 7. Deployment Modes for OJE [From USAREUR AAR Volume I] 
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a.        Air 
The move from home station or the port of embarkation to the ISB was 
non-tactical. Units moved as transportation packages by some combination of air, train, 
bus or convoy to the ISB where the 21st TAACOM (Forward) and the 29th Area Support 
Group would receive, stage, and onward move the soldiers into Bosnia. Figure 7 depicts 
the many modes of transportation the deploying forces would use. 
For the deployment to Bosnia in support of Operation Joint Endeavor, 
USAREUR planned to use one of the two Air Force Bases strictly as an aerial port of 
embarkation (APOE) for deployers and the other as an APOD for receiving active and 
reserve component units from CONUS. But, because of shortages in other modes of 
transportation, compressed deployment timelines and the weather, USAREUR was 
forced to increase the use of airlift and open both airports as APOEs. 
Rhein-Main Air Base, famous for its support of the Berlin Airlift, is 
located only a few miles south of Frankfurt, Germany in the heart of the country. In 
April 1995, Rhein-Main Air Base, known as the "Gateway to Europe," had just 
completed drawing down to about half of its 1993 strength (Rhein-Main History Website, 
2001). Early in the deployment planning, USAREUR staffers determined that Rhein- 
Main would be the APOD for deploying units from CONUS. This decision was made for 
two reasons: first, since Ramstein Air Base's runways and taxiways were originally 
designed for fighters, they were not ideal for Air Mobility Command (AMC) aircraft and 
second, Rhein-Main was originally designed as a passenger terminal and was much more 
efficient in handling passengers (V Corps AAR, 1997). In addition, the only functioning 
Air Terminal Movement Control Team (ATMCT) was located at Rhein-Main.   The 
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ATMCT at Rhein-Main and the Arrival/Departure Air Field Control Group (A/DACG) at 
Ramstein were the primary interface with the Air Force airmen and loadmasters on the 
ground at the air bases (Sundin Interview, 1996). These soldiers were assigned to the 37 
Transportation Command in Kaiserslautern, but were actually stationed at the air bases. 
The other base, Ramstein Air Base, was located outside of Kaiserslautern, 
Germany about an hour from the French-German border. USAREUR determined that 
this base would be the hub for receiving and flowing sustainment material. During the 
operation, Ramstein would become a huge transfer area for critical resupply items such as 
repair parts and petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL). Ramstein would receive these items 
from CONUS on strategic airlift and then forward them to the ISB. During the 
sustainment phase, Ramstein was chosen as the sole APOE and therefore would be 
responsible for not only the sustainment material flow, but also for the personnel 
replacement flow as well. 
During the entire operation, 27% of the passengers and 12% of the cargo 
deployed into the AO were transported by air (USAREUR AAR Volume II, 1997, p. 
256). There were two primary airplanes transporting passengers and cargo into Hungary 
and Bosnia. The theater lift C-130 Hercules assets belonging to U.S. Air Forces Europe 
(USAFE) performed the bulk of the hauling, transporting 80% of the passengers and 50% 
of the cargo moved by air into the AO. The other main workhorse was the new C-17 
Globemaster III aircraft. This was the first operational test for this aircraft and of the 
1,358 sorties the Air Force performed, about 25% of those were flown by the C-17. 
However, this roughly 340 sorties accounted for approximately 50% of the cargo moved 
by air (V Corps AAR, 1997). Although these two types of aircraft provided the majority 
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of the lift for this mission, C-5 Galaxys and C-141 Starlifters participated in the mission 
also. 
b.        Rail 
Deploying by rail in Germany was much more complicated than deploying 
by air. The biggest difference between the two is that for Operation Joint Endeavor, there 
were only two APOEs, Ramstein and Rhein-Main. However, there were 30 different 
railheads throughout Germany that were used as deploying railheads (USAREUR AAR 
Volume I, 1997, p. 167). As previously mentioned, the ASGs and BSBs were 
responsible for acting as "launching platforms" for the deploying units from their 
communities. This was particularly true for rail operations. 
Almost every military community in Germany had a railhead. More often 
than not, this was nothing more than a spur or a siding off a main line. But that, coupled 
with a loading ramp, gave each BSB the capability to load trains to deploy their units. 
Because the majority of equipment for this operation was planned to deploy by rail, BSBs 
had to be highly proficient at rail loading vehicles. 
The Deutsche Bundesbahn (DB) provided railcars to USAREUR based on 
requests from deploying units. There were many problems with the initial rail load phase 
of the deployment, but those will be discussed in Chapter III. The biggest issue was 
caused by the fact that the DB had been privatized as part of deregulation of the German 
railroad industry, therefore USAREUR had to compete against German firms for railcars. 
Another difficulty was that USAREUR had planned for dining cars to deploy with each 
train, but because there were none available, coaches or sleeping cars were substituted 
(Schneider Interview, 1996). 
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During the deployment, a total of 409 trains were used to transport cargo 
into Hungary and Croatia. Each of these trains averaged 35 to 38 cars and cost the U.S. 
government between DM180,000 and DM 230,000, which converted at the 1995 
exchange rate of approximately DM1.50 per dollar is about $120,000 to $150,000 
(Schneider Interview, 1996). 
Of the more than 7,000 railcars used during the operation to transport 
cargo, there were six principal types of cars used. Among these were K cars, which are 
12-meters, RS cars, which are 18-meters, and SAS, RLM and P cars, which are heavy 
duty cars used for transporting Task Force Eagle's Ml Al Abrams tanks and the M2 
Bradley fighting vehicles. The final type of car used was the TWA or "trans wagon." 
This was a deep-welled car that was used for carrying oversize, but not necessarily heavy 
equipment (Sundin Interview, 1996). 
Because part of the original plan was to deploy personnel by rail along 
with unit cargo, there was also a significant use of sleeping cars and coaches. Many of 
the first trains that departed had several coaches, which were designed to carry 50 people, 
with between 30 and 35 soldiers loaded onto each car. During the deployment, over 
15,000 soldiers deployed by rail, with over half that total coming in the first 30 days 
(USAREUR AAR Volume II, 1997, p. 249). Because the train trip to Hungary from 
Germany would last anywhere from four to five days, USAREUR decided to limit the 
number of personnel deploying by rail. Instead they opted for deploying personnel 
aboard commercial buses, a trip that lasted only 24 hours. 
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c. Commercial Truck 
Although there was never a comprehensive plan for using commercial 
trucks during the deployment, these vehicles were used extensively for carrying many 
different types of cargo. In most cases, commercial trucks were a stopgap method to 
make up for a shortage of other assets, such as rail cars or military trucks. However, at 
the beginning of the deployment, special tenders were established in Germany by the 1st 
Theater Movement Control Agency for moving medical supplies and food. A tender is 
essentially a contract between a qualified transportation provider and the U.S. 
government (Joint Deployment Training Center (JDTC) Glossary, 1998). 
There were numerous ad hoc movements, especially for oversize and 
outsize cargo that could not be moved by rail. There were many cases where a unit 
would be loading at a railhead and would not have sufficient rail cars to finish the load. 
The unit would move the equipment off to the side and call the BMCT to request 
commercial trucks to move the excess cargo. 
d. Convoy 
The original deployment plan called for very few, if any unit convoys 
during the deployment. The route between Germany and Hungary was over 1,000 
kilometers, through several nations, and with no ability for USAREUR to support the 
convoys in between. However, during the initial days of the deployment, the movement 
timeline was compressed and several combat units were moved up in the flow. Because 
of the shortage of time, units such as the 181st Transportation Battalion, V Corps' only 
organic transportation battalion, which was tasked with onward movement from the ISB, 
was ordered to convoy from Germany to the ISB. 
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On 11 December 1995, the first of four 181st Transportation Battalion 
convoys departed Mannheim enroute to the ISB. The final convoy departed on 19 
December and all convoys had closed in Kaposvar, Hungary by 23 December. Each 
convoy took three days to drive and on the last night before arriving in Hungary, the each 
convoy overnighted at an Austrian Army Kaserne, a first for this deployment (Herson, 
1996). This convoy deployment was extremely challenging for the battalion, but they 
successfully accomplished the mission. 
Although very few units actually deployed in their entirety by convoy to 
Operation Joint Endeavor, convoys were consistently used to deploy excess equipment, 
much in the same manner that ad hoc commercial trucks were used. The 28th 
Transportation Battalion, assigned to the 37th Transportation Command, had five 
companies of M915 tractors and M872 trailers, essentially a long haul tractor-trailer 
combination. These combinations were heavily used to deploy unit equipment, but 
would also form the basis of the "Eagle Express." 
"Eagle Express" was the codename for the surface LOC between Germany 
and Hungary, and the same term would also later be used for the daily resupply convoys 
that the 28th Transportation Battalion would run from Germany to Hungary. "Eagle 
Express" was designed to provide reliable resupply and the ability to expedite high 
priority, outsized or overweight cargo on a regular basis (Kubiszewski, 1997, p. 5). 
"Eagle Express" convoys continue to perform their resupply mission to this day. 
e.        Bus 
The main mode for passenger ground travel anywhere in theater was 
commercial  bus.     The  deployment  of personnel  from  Germany to  Hungary  by 
47 
commercial bus took 20 to 24 hours. The buses that were contracted from German bus 
companies were either 50 or 60 passenger buses. However, as a planning factor, the bus 
would only be filled to half capacity. This would allow room for soldiers' bags and other 
belongings. 
Personnel movements within the AO were also accomplished by commercial 
buses contracted from Hungarian bus companies. When units went through the onward 
movement phase of RSOI, the personnel were moved from Hungary to Croatia via 
commercial bus. Once the bus reached its destination in Croatia, the personnel would 
dismount and then link up with their respective combat or tactical vehicle to drive into 
Bosnia. 
Using all modes of transportation, with the exception of sea movement, was the 
key to the successful deployment of Task Force Eagle. Figure 8 shows the 
accomplishments of the various modes of the deployment and the overall success of the 
Operation Joint Endeavor deployment. 
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Figure 8. OJE Deployment Mode Accomplishments [From USAREUR AAR 
Volume I] 
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3.        Deployment Routes 
a.        Germany to Hungary/Croatia 
From Germany, equipment and personnel being transported followed 
many different routes, depending on what mode of transportation was being used. The 
easiest routes to describe are the air deployment routes. Aircraft departed either Rhein- 
Main or Ramstein and flew to either Taszar Air Base in Hungary or Tuzla Air Base in 
Bosnia. Since very few people were deploying directly into Bosnia, the most heavily 
traveled routes were between the two APOE and Taszar, Hungary. Another air 
deployment route that was discussed, but was not heavily used was Aviano Air Base, 
Italy to Tuzla, Bosnia. This was the route that the 3-325 Airborne Infantry used, but 
because very few units deployed from Italy, the route was not heavily traveled. Two 
reserve MCTs, the 793rd and the 663rd, would also deploy from Italy, but they deployed 
by commercial bus from Vicenza, through Austria, to Taszar, Hungary (Swartz, 1997). 
The final air deployment route was established later in the deployment and that was a link 
between Taszar and Tuzla. This was put in place to get high priority personnel quickly 
from Hungary to Bosnia. 
On the commercial truck, bus and military convoy side, again, different 
routes were employed.   The commercial truckers, who were not bound by a specific 
route, would usually follow the route that would get them into Hungary the fastest. 
Because commercial trucks were paid by the load, German trucking companies wanted to 
get the cargo to Hungary as fast as possible and get the drivers back to haul another load. 
The faster that happened, the more money the company would make. Commercial buses 
and military convoys essentially followed the same deployment route, depending on 
where   they   originated.      The   military   convoys   and   buses   departing   from   the 
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Kaiserslautern, Heidelberg, or Mannheim areas would follow German Autobahn 6 until it 
connected with Autobahn 3 around Nuremberg. 
Convoys and buses originating from Wiesbaden, Hanau, Darmstadt, or 
Bad Kreuznach had more of a direct access to Autobahn 3 and would follow that road the 
entire time. Once on Autobahn 3, the convoys would essentially take it all the way 
through Austria into Hungary. Once in Hungary the drivers would follow a series of 
local roads south, around Lake Balaton, until they reached Kaposvar and Taszar, 
Hungary. However, later in the deployment and into the sustainment phase, these 
convoys would follow Autobahn 3 all the way to Budapest, Hungary and then travel local 
roads to the ISB. This enabled the convoys to take advantage of the better roads in and 
around Budapest (Sundin Interview, 1996). 
Because of the distance that military convoys had to travel, almost 1,000 
kilometers, there was no possible way for the drivers to complete the journey in one day. 
Military regulations limit the number of hours a driver can drive in one day and dictate to 
that driver the amount of rest they must get between driving segments. Therefore the 37th 
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) designed two convoy support centers (CSC) to 
support overnight stops by the convoy. These CSCs were large enough to support up to 
150 soldiers and 50 vehicles. The CSCs were located at the Prince Leopold Kaserne, a 
German Army post, in Regensberg, Germany and the Benedek Kaserne, an Austrian 
Army post, in Brück, Austria (Kubiszewski, 1997). Soldiers from the 28th Transportation 
Battalion, a subordinate unit of the 37th TRANSCOM operated the CSCs with assistance 
from local sources. The CSCs were tremendously successful and the concept was the 
main reason there were no major accidents during convoy deployments. 
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The rail deployment for Operation Joint Endeavor was a little more 
complicated. Because Austria is a non-NATO country, there was some initial resistance 
from the Austrian government to allow U.S. equipment to flow through. So the initial 
trains deploying from Germany were routed through the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
then into Hungary. This route was much longer than the more direct route through 
Austria, and also imposed certain restrictions on the trains, including train length (450 
meters) and weight (1300 metric tons), tiedowns instead of chock block for securing 
vehicles, and type of locomotive used (Schneider Interview, 1996). About a week into 
the deployment, Austria finally consented to allow U.S. forces and equipment to transit 
their country. Once Austria allowed rail movement, it made it easier to divert trains to 
Slovanski Brod and Zupanje, Croatia in order to alleviate the congestion in Hungary. 
Deploying trains were also diverted from Hungary in order to move the LOC opening 
package directly into Croatia. 
b.        Hungary to Croatia (Onward Movement) 
The route for the onward movement portion of the RSOI process was a 
twelve-hour main supply route (MSR) from Kaposvar to Zupanje.   The route took the 
daily convoys from Kaposvar due west before the road turned due south.  A short time 
later, the convoy would arrive at the town of Bares, where they would cross the border 
between Hungary and Croatia. Shortly after crossing the border, the convoy would come 
to its first convoy support center. This CSC was operated and supported by soldiers from 
the 51st Maintenance Battalion and provided some basic necessities to the road-weary 
soldiers.   After departing from the CSC, the convoy continued south to the town of 
Kutina, Croatia.  At Kutina, the convoy turned east and proceeded on an autobahn-type 
road.   This enabled the convoys to travel at higher rates of speed in order to reach 
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Slovanski Brod and Zupanje faster (Herson, 1996). The convoy vehicles would remain 
overnight at the TAA and then return to Kaposvar the next day, making every onward 
movement iteration a two-day process. 
4. Intermediate Staging Base Operations (Hungary) 
The picture in Figure 9 is a comprehensive portrayal of the ISB in Kaposvar- 
Taszar, Hungary. It shows all the components that made this area an easy selection to 
serve as the ISB: C-5 capable all weather airfield, four active railheads, an ample road 
network benefiting both deployers and the onward movement part of RSOI, and an 
economic infrastructure to support the requirements of this type of operation. In addition, 
Kaposvar-Taszar was relatively close (only 310 kilometers) to Tuzla, Bosnia, making it 
an excellent consolidation point for the deployment (USAREUR AAR, Volume 1, p. 
121). 







6305 soldier capacity 
C5 all weather airfield 
4 active railheads 
460 vehicle staging park 
358 heavy transport 
vehicles 
Figure 9. The ISB Transportation Infrastructure [From USAREUR AAR Volume I] 
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The concept for the ISB was that units would deploy from Germany through one 
of the nodes located in Kaposvar or Taszar, Hungary, go through a reception and staging 
process conducted by the 29th Support Group, commanded by Colonel John Deyermond, 
and then move to the Tactical Assembly Area in Zupanje, Croatia. The ISB was to 
synchronize the deployment by merging people, equipment and supplies together before 
their onward movement to Croatia and integration into the TFE AO. 
The ISB was also the location of the United States National Support Element. 
The NSE consisted of USAREUR (Forward) and the 21st TAACOM (Forward), which 
was made up mostly of personnel from the 3rd COSCOM, performing both operation and 
corps level logistics functions. Additional units attached to USAREUR (Forward) and 
21st TAACOM (Forward) during the deployment were the 19th Corps Material 
Management Center (CMMC) a COSCOM unit; the 200th Theater Army Material 
Management Center (TAMMC), a TAACOM unit; the 27th Movement Control Battalion, 
a COSCOM unit; and the 28th Transportation Battalion, a TAACOM unit, among many 
others. Table 7 shows the composition of the NSE, broken down by unit and numbers of 
personnel. By looking at the types of units, the table also shows the myriad of functions 
that the units in the NSE performed. 
USAREUR NSE Forces 
USAREUR (Forward) Headquarters 328 personnel 
21st TAACOM (Forward) Headquarters 220 personnel 
200th TAMMC/19* MMC/27th Trans Bn/Higway Reg 136 personnel 
266th Finance Command 22 personnel 
29th ASG 165 personnel 
51st Ordnance Battalion 415 personnel 
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95th MP Battalion 260 personnel 
28th Transportation Battalion 560 personnel 
191st Ordnance Battalion 360 personnel 
330th Rear Tactical Operations Center (RTOC) 30 personnel 
Civil Affairs 22 personnel 
16th CSG (77th Maint 00/515* Trans Co/26th QM Co 591 personnel 
1st Personnel Command (PERSCOM) 158 personnel 
30th Medical Brigade 467 personnel 
7th Signal Brigade 365 personnel 
TFE Quartering Parties 100 personnel 
Total Strength: 4,199 
Table 7. USAREUR NSE Units and Strengths [After USARUER AAR Volume II] 
But the greatest responsibility of the ISB was to serve as the "runnel" to transfer 
deploying units out of the deployment mode and into a more operational mode. The 29th 
Support Group would accomplish that mission. 
In Hungary, the 29 Support Group was responsible for many tasks, including the 
personnel reception station, the life support area for housing transient troops, the 
container handling area, three separate railheads, an airfield, direct support supply and 
maintenance activities and the staging area (Chroman, 1996). The railheads, reception 
station and staging areas were critical to the deployment's success. 
Upon arrival in the ISB, the 29th Support Group assumed operations immediately. 
Because the deployment had already started and movement priorities had shifted, the 
units were simultaneously operating and trying to establish their operations.   The four 
railheads in the ISB were able to accommodate between six to eight trains per day and the 
most immediate impact was felt at the railheads, where trains laden with unit equipment 
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were already starting to back up. However, the unit was able to shift resources toward 
the railhead and alleviate some of the initial backup. Once units arrived, their vehicles 
were immediately taken to the staging area, which once was an aircraft runway at this 
former Hungarian MIG base in Taszar. 
Once in the staging area, unit personnel began to prepare those vehicles for 
onward movement. The 29th Support Group's subordinate maintenance, supply and 
ammunition units fueled, fixed, armed and supplied the personnel and equipment in every 
way possible to prepare them for movement. Unit movement officers would submit 
requests for external lift to the 30th MCT, located at the airfield, if they had anything that 
they could not organically move. The MCT would then in turn task either the 28th 
Transportation Battalion or the 181st Transportation Battalion to provide assets to move 
the unit. The primary vehicles committed to assist the deployment of TFE were M915 
tractor and M8 72-40 foot trailer combinations for carrying containers or light tracked 
vehicles, the Ml074 Palletized Load System (PLS) tractor with Ml076 PLS trailer for 
carrying containers or light vehicles and the Ml070 Heavy Equipment Transporter (HET) 
with Ml 000 trailer for carrying Ml Al tanks and M2A2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles. In 
addition, the 181st Transportation Battalion's 515th Transportation Company's 5,000- 
gallon fuel tankers were heavily used to refuel TFE's equipment. 
USAREUR (Forward) prioritized the call forward of units from the ISB, based on 
the needs of the TFE commander. Daily call forward briefings were held to identify 
requirements and notify units that they had been called forward. Once the unit had been 
called forward to the TAA, they would be restaged in convoy order and upload their 
external lifts on trucks from the two transportation battalions.   The evening prior to 
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departure, convoy commanders were briefed and then units went through a final 
certification and validation process to ensure that everything was on hand and accounted 
for. The next morning, starting at 0400, the first convoys would depart Taszar enroute to 
Croatia. One convoy would depart every hour for the next seven hours. On a normal 
day, seven convoys departed the ISB and the seven convoys that departed the previous 
day returned. This process continued in exactly the same fashion from 16 December 
1995 until the deployment was complete on 14 February 1996. 
Another aspect of the ISB was the freight forwarding area (FFA), which occupied 
a piece of runway, much like the staging area did. The FFA was established in the 
middle of the deployment period to accommodate the increasing amount of high priority 
supplies that were being pushed into theater. When an Air Force aircraft would land at 
Taszar with cargo, the FFA was responsible for discharging the cargo and staging it for 
onward movement or distribution within the ISB. Once the FFA had the cargo, they 
would coordinate with the MCT for assets to deliver the cargo to the customer unit. It 
was a much more efficient way to handle this cargo and alleviated some of the pressure 
from the 29th Support Group. Eventually, a reserve component MCT was deployed from 
Italy to control the FFA. 
5. Tactical Assembly Area Operations (Croatia) 
Doctrine defines the TAA as an area that is generally out of the reach of light 
artillery and where units make final preparations (pre-combat checks and inspections) 
and rest, prior to moving to the line of departure. In the case of Operation Joint 
Endeavor, the TAA was more than just a stopping point, it was a place where units in the 
1st Armored Division assembled their combat power prior to crossing the Sava River. It 
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housed and organized deploying forces for the road march to Tuzla, Bosnia, some 50 
kilometers away. 
The TAA was located in Zupanje, Croatia and was essentially nothing more than 
a huge open field where units parked their vehicles. The area was in the vicinity of the 
pontoon bridge that the engineers assembled to allow TFE units to cross into Bosnia. 
There were essentially two ways to get to the TAA, the first being convoy from the ISB 
and the second being train from Germany. Although the original plan intended on 
everything flowing through Hungary, this proved not to be the case. Because of the 
requirement to compress deployment timelines, USAREUR had to rush to get the LOC- 
opening force and its support slice to Croatia. Since there was already a backlog 
developing in the deployment, these forces were moved directly to the TAA. 
If the unit arrived in the TAA by convoy, all wheeled vehicles were driven by unit 
personnel, while tracked vehicles were transported using the heavy equipment 
transporters for M1A1 tanks and other trailers for lighter tracked vehicles. Personnel 
unable to ride in the military vehicles were forced to deploy to the TAA in commercial 
buses. At the TAA, all vehicles were discharged and unit personnel began making the 
final inspections to prepare to cross the Sava. Personnel and equipment accountability 
was paramount in this environment and was part of the validation necessary to cross the 
bridge. Once validated, units prepared their vehicles for the convoy into Bosnia. 
The rail system in the TAA included two very small railheads, one each at 
Slovanski Brod and Zupanje.  The Zupanje railhead was capable of unloading only one 
train at a time. The whole train could not be brought into the discharge site, so the train 
had to be broken into segments in order to be unloaded. The railhead was also on a one- 
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st 
way spur, which meant that after the train segment was offloaded, the whole operation 
had to cease in order to back the train out and bring in a new one. The Slovanski Brod 
railhead was a little better and had a capability to discharge vehicles via a side ramp, but 
initially, neither railhead had a ramp capable of downloading a tank. Eventually, Zupanje 
was able to discharge one to two trains per day and Slovanski Brod was able to discharge 
three trains per day. 
One of the earliest units to arrive in the TAA was the 16th Corps Support Group, 
one of the logistical support units attached to the 1st Armored Division. However, 
because of congestion in the ISB, the CSG was sent directly to Camp Harmon. The CSG 
had a transportation platoon attached from the 51st Transportation Company, 181 
Transportation Battalion. That platoon was extremely busy repositioning supplies for the 
engineers at Zupanje assembling the bridge. In addition, trucks from the 70th 
Transportation Company and the 377th Transportation Company were moving supplies 
and equipment on a 12-hour convoy along the MSR from the ISB to the engineers at 
Zupanje (Herson, 1996). This would prove to be a very difficult and trying time for the 
transportation companies. 
6. Crossing the Sava and Occupying the Base Camps 
The peace agreement signed in Paris, dictated an immediate combat presence in 
Bosnia. USAREUR plans had assumed at least a two-week window after the 
agreementbefore the first portions of Task Force Eagle began deploying. This particular 
portion of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) surprised everyone and 
cut the two-week lead-time to about four days. This cut caused serious problems with the 
steady deliberate flow USAREUR wanted.    USAREUR had to make a decision on 
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whether to deploy the RSOI and LOC opening packages or to deploy the initial portion of 
Task Force Eagle. USAREUR decided to deploy portions of both and to use the 
railheads in Zupanje and Slavonski Brod, Croatia to receive units. 
The first element to reach Zupanje, the proposed site of the pontoon bridge, was 
the 502nd Engineer Company. The 1st Battalion, 1st Cavalry arrived on 19 December and 
established Staging Area (SA) Harmon, later to be renamed TAA Harmon. Additional 
engineers flowed directly into Zupanje and Slavonski Brod and on 22 December, the 
engineers began ramp construction for the pontoon bridge across the Sava River. As 
preparations neared completion, unanticipated flooding on 28 December 1995 destroyed 
much of the ramp work for the bridge (V Corps AAR, 1997). Because the flood 
significantly increased the high water mark of the Sava River, the engineers were caught 
short without enough bridging material. This forced the acceleration of another bridge 
company, further complicating the change in the flow plan (Bryant Interview, 1996). 
However, because of the diligence of the engineers and a quick support response from the 
logisticians in the ISB, the operation was quickly returned to its previous state and the 
pontoon bridge across the Sava River was completed on 31 December 1995. The 1-1 
Cavalry crossed into Bosnia on the same day and by the end of the day, over 180 vehicles 
had crossed the bridge (Collins and Koons, 1997). 
Because the flow was initially so compressed, another deployment decision that 
needed to be made was the priority of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 
(LOGCAP) and Force Provider supplies. These supplies contained all the materials 
necessary to construct the base camps where our combat units would be living for a year. 
Each LOGCAP and Force Provider convoy crossing the river would mean that one 
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convoy of combat vehicles was not crossing. An attempt was made to balance the flow 
across the Sava as much as possible, but base camps were not completed by the time 
most combat units rumbled in. 
The 2n Brigade Combat Team began crossing the river on 4 January 1996 and 
was completely closed in Bosnia on 24 January. The 1st BCT began crossing the river 
immediately following the 1-1 Cavalry. The 1st BCT closed in Bosnia on 20 January. A 
second pontoon bridge across the Sava was completed on 17 January, making two-way 
traffic possible and decreasing the congestion at the main bridge site. However, despite 
force closure in late January, it would be almost two months until all of the Task Force 
Eagle base camps were complete (V Corps AAR, 1997). 
C.        SUSTAINMENT PERIOD (20 MARCH - 20 DECEMBER 1996) 
As indicated, full sustainment in the AO was reached by 20 March 1996. The 
flow of all classes of supply extended from base camps in Bosnia, through Germany and 
back to CONUS. A system was in place for requisitioning and moving materials on a 
high priority basis, depending on the class of supply. Palletized and containerized 
material from CONUS flowed into Ramstein Air Base and was transported via air or 
convoy into Hungary, Croatia or Bosnia. Distribution between the ISB and Bosnia was 
accomplished using either military truck or the CH-47 Chinook helicopter. 
All classes of supply had reached a steady state consumption level and systems 
were in place for the resupply of all logistics functions. Food and water reached its ration 
cycle goal in Bosnia on D+95 because of a shortage of refrigeration units. The LOGCAP 
contractor, Brown and Root Services Company (BRSC) operated all the dining facilities 
in each area with augmentation from local nationals. As previously mentioned, a tender 
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was established with a German transportation/distributor named ESKO to deliver rations 
from Germany. Bottled water was initially supplied, but was changed to bagged water 
from a local water plant at considerable savings. (USAREUR AAR, 1997,129) 
The system of refineries in Hungary and Croatia provided all the necessary fuel 
and POL to the deployed force. The fuel consumption level had dropped from a high of 
110,000 gallons per day during the deployment to a steady state usage of about 32,000 
gallons per day (USAREUR AAR, 1997, 127). Ammunition was located in ammunition 
holding areas (AHA) in the ISB and TFE AO. Very few difficulties with ammunition 
were encountered and the redeployment plan for handling ammunition was 
comprehensive. 
A distribution system using total asset visibility (TAV) and intransit visibility 
(ITV) was in place using radio frequency (RF) tags to track cargo. Convoys were 
incorporating the Defense Transportation Tracking System (DTRACS or DTTS) into 
their movements, enabling them to communicate with a dispatcher and also providing 
that dispatcher with up to the minute location information (Kubiszewski, 1997, p. 6). 
Finally, the overall equipment readiness posture in OJE was above the Army 
average. This is in large part due to systems that were in place to ensure the highest level 
of mission capability. There were Corps Material Management Center personnel in both 
the ISB and TFE, Army Material Command had a logistics support element (LSE) in the 
ISB and support personnel in Bosnia and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) were 
providing assistance in both Hungary and Bosnia. 
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D.       REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING 
Almost as soon as the deployment was completed in February 1996, USAREUR 
(Forward) began planning for the redeployment while the lessons of the deployment were 
still fresh in everyone's minds. LTG Abrams was adamant that the redeployment would 
not be a repeat of the deployment, and in order to accomplish that, the staff had to start 
planning early. In preparing the plan to redeploy forces from Bosnia, Croatia and 
Hungary, the staff took into account lessons from the deployment as well as lessons from 
the deployment to and redeployment from Operation Desert Storm. Because LTG 
Abrams and many of his staff were Desert Storm veterans, they knew many of the pitfalls 
that befell the redeploying forces from that operation. Chief among those was the length 
of time the unit took to reconstitute upon return to home station. LTG Abrams' vision 
was for the 1st Armored Division and other deployed units to be essentially combat ready 
when they returned to Germany. In order to accomplish that goal, the redeployment had 
to be disciplined, deliberate, detailed, logistically supported, capable of accounting for 
equipment and focused on maintaining unit integrity (USAREUR AAR Volume I, 1997, 
p. 174). The graphic in Figure 7 below depicts USAREUR's redeployment plan. 
CENTRAL 
REGION C ISB TASZAR o RSB S-BROD c THE BOX 
CONUS BOUND       i 
Recovery Timeline 
NORTH BRIGADE 
■        1 DAY TRAVEL IDA Y TRAVEL    1           1DAY TRAVEL 
MAX 3 DAY CYCLE 7 DAY CYCLE                  3 DAY CYCLE SOUTH BRIGADE 
2 DAY TRAVEL 
Figure 10.       Redeployment Phases and Timeline [From USAREUR AAR Volume II] 
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During Operation Joint Endeavor, Bosnia was referred to as "the box," a term that 
is used to refer to the maneuver area at an Army major training center. During 
redeployment, TFE units would pack all supplies, equipment and material not required by 
the follow-on force and would prepare to depart their base camps by convoy enroute to 
Slavonski Brod, Croatia. Prior to departure, the Unit Movement Officers from each 
company would input their level four TPFDD data into a TC-ACCIS computer located at 
the local movement control team. This would enable the unit's information to eventually 
transfer to JOPES in order for a redeployment TPFDD to be built. 
At the start of phase two, units would convoy to Slavonski Brod, which for the 
purpose of the redeployment was called the Redeployment Staging Base (RSB). 
USAREUR planned three days of unit processing in the RSB and activities included 
everything from vehicle maintenance and refueling to returning bulk supplies and non- 
unit equipment to Central Region. In addition, an advance party would move from the 
RSB to the ISB in order to update its TPFDD data at the 30th MCT in Taszar, Hungary. 
Upon completing their RSB processing, unit personnel would load commercial 
buses or organic unit vehicles for the trek to the ISB. Phase three of the redeployment 
would take place in the ISB and would last for seven days. The ISB process focused on 
unit and individual reorganization and refitting. Tasks include vehicle maintenance and 
washing, excess equipment turn-in and medical and dental screenings. In addition to this 
processing, combat units went to Taborfalva Training Area in Hungary for gunnery 
(USAREUR AAR Volume I, 1997, p. 176). Once all these activities were completed, 
unit equipment was rail loaded for movement to Germany and unit personnel boarded 
commercial buses for their redeployment to home station. 
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The final redeployment phase, phase four was accomplished upon return to 
Germany. This phase was basically an extension of the activities conducted in the ISB 
and focused on reconstituting combat capabilities. Everything that the unit had shipped 
from either the RSB or ISB was received and brought to the unit's home station. 
Additional vehicle maintenance and medical screenings were conducted. In addition, 
soldiers received items like their personal belongings and POVs, which had been stored 
prior to the deployment. 
Task Force Eagle began redeployment on 7 October 1996, nearly ten months after 
it had deployed. The redeployment would take almost two months, until 1 December 
1996, when last elements of the 1st Armored Division left Bosnia and returned to 
Germany. The redeployment process developed by USAREUR was very effective. 
Units returned to home station without facing all the normal problems associated with 
redeploying from a major operation. The functions normally facing unit personnel upon 
their return from deployment were accomplished in either the RSB or ISB. The units 
were essentially "fit to fight" immediately upon their return to Germany. 
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III.    ANALYSIS OF ISSUES ARISING DURING THE 
DEPLOYMENT TO OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR 
The consensus about the effectiveness of the Operation Joint Endeavor 
deployment and logistics operations is (1) they were generally successful and (2) U.S. 
forces were fairly well prepared to conduct them. As in all military operations of this 
scale, however, some significant problems did arise. This chapter explores the major 
challenges confronted by units during the deployment. The analysis will cover 
difficulties encountered in Germany, during movement, at the ISB and in the TAA. 
Through this analysis, a more detailed assessment of operational effectiveness can be 
made. 
A.       CENTRAL REGION ISSUES 
Even in the best-planned operations, challenges inevitably arise before the 
operation even starts. The same is true for Operation Joint Endeavor. As a result of the 
end of the Cold War, before planning for Operation Joint Endeavor commenced, military 
decision makers decided to reduce the size of the forward deployed force. Because of 
this decision, transportation and logistics capabilities were significantly cut. Then, during 
the planning phase, USAREUR and V Corps planners encountered difficulties that would 
affect the initial phase of the operation. Finally, the execution of the deployment was 
completely changed when the GFAP was signed and military commanders were informed 
for the first time that their timeline had been significantly compressed. 
1. Transportation Personnel and Equipment Availability 
To say the least, the transportation capability in Germany used to be robust. 
However, because the Cold War ended and military policymakers decided to reduce the 
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U.S. Army's forward presence around the world, transportation capability in Germany 
took a serious blow. Several examples are listed below. It is also interesting to note that 
these units did not exist in the Reserve Component structure in Europe, but did exist in 
the Reserve and the Active Components in the United States. However, there were no 
RC transportation or movement control units from the United States activated to support 
this mission, nor were additional AC transportation companies deployed to assist in this 
deployment. 
a.        181st Transportation Battalion 
The 181s Trans Battalion went from six line companies in 1990, all 
Authorized Level of Organization (ALO)-l to three companies in 1995, one at ALO-2, 
one at ALO-3 and one at ALO-4 (Herson, 1996). ALO relates to the ratio of a unit's 
authorized manpower spaces to its full table of organization and equipment (TOE) 
spaces. A unit is authorized to requisition personnel based on their ALO. ALO 1 means 
a unit has 100% of its TOE spaces, ALO-2 is 90%, ALO-3 is 80% and ALO-4, less than 
80%. This illuminates the significant reduction, not only in the number of units, but also 
in the number of personnel. This considerable reduction in personnel had a direct impact 
on the battalion's ability to execute an ambitious force projection and sustainment 
mission such as OJE. This was further exacerbated by the fact that each company had 
100% of its authorized equipment, even though there were insufficient personnel to 
operate and maintain all of it. In addition, the deploying transportation units did not 
receive additional personnel to bring them to ALO-1, as the combat units that were 
deploying to Bosnia did. 
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Another challenge to the transportation battalion presented itself on the 
equipment side of the equation. In October 1995, two of the companies in the battalion 
were being fielded with new equipment, the PLS to the 51st Transportation Company and 
the HET to the 377th Transportation Company. In addition to the fielding, the units were 
in the process of preparing their old equipment for turn-in. However, at the time the 
warning order was issued, each of the units had only received roughly 50% of their 
authorized vehicles. So the battalion received an accelerated fielding of the remainder of 
the equipment for the two companies. This caused problems with licensed operators, 
repair parts and maintenance support. 
Because the unit had received such a late surge of new equipment, the 
companies did not have adequate time to train and license all assigned soldiers on the 
new equipment. This licensing was essentially done as on-the-job training during the 
unit's deployment convoy to Hungary. When the trucks broke down, it was difficult to 
obtain spare parts through the supply system. Because the trucks were new, no demand 
history had been established for critical parts and therefore, the Class IX support for the 
trucks was limited. The Class IX repair parts "push" package that existed was inadequate 
to support the vehicles given the pace of the missions. In addition, maintenance on the 
trucks was accomplished under warranty contract with European Support Contract 
Maintenance (ESCM) in Germany. Because this organization was made up of German 
civilians, the Hungarian Labor Ministry forbid them from coming to Hungary to support 
the 181st's maintenance needs (Herson, 1996). Therefore, the task of maintenance fell on 
the 51st Maintenance Battalion, which had neither experience nor tools to fix the new 
PLS and HET. This would cause problems throughout the deployment. 
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The receipt of additional equipment was the final problem that affected the 
181st Transportation Battalion. Prior to the deployment, the 181st Transportation 
Battalion received additional M872-40 foot trailers, forty additional M967-5,000 gallon 
fuel tankers, 700 PLS flatracks, numerous twenty foot MILVANs, and fifty refrigerated 
vans from the Combat Equipment Group - Europe (CEGE) to supplement their mission 
(Herson, 1996). With its limited personnel resources, this additional equipment further 
degraded the battalion's ability to perform its mission. 
b. 37th Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) 
The 37th TRANSCOM, the theater's transporters, is the only active duty 
brigade theater truck transportation unit. Before the drawdown, the 37th consisted of 
three full strength American transportation battalions, the 28th, 53rd and 106th and a fully 
manned 6966th Civilian Support Center. However, in the drawdown, the 53rd and 106th 
battalions were deactivated and the 6966th was reduced by more than 1/3 (Kubiszewski, 
1997). These reductions placed some serious roadblocks between the 37th TRANSCOM 
and mission accomplishment. 
The 37th TRANSCOM is responsible for handling a large piece of the 
Central Region transportation support requirement. Before OJE, the battalion provided 
320 trucks daily to support these missions (Kubiszewski, 1997), including delivering the 
mail and moving critical classes of supply throughout the region. In order to provide the 
required truck support for the deployment and continue Central Region support, the 37th 
TRANSCOM and its subordinate units were stretched very thin. 
However, truck support was not the only support required from the 37th. 
In addition, the 21st TAACOM tasked the 37th as the Theater Executive Agent for RSOI 
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for units inbound from CONUS. Because of this tasking, the unit was forced to establish 
AACG and ATMCTs in order to support this mission. However, because of personnel 
shortages within the command, the ATMCT was only manned by ten soldiers instead of 
the 37 required by Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) (V Corps 
AAR, 1997). This further stressed the capabilities of the TRANSCOM. 
One final task for the already weary 37th was the preparation and 
placement of eight rough terrain container handlers (RTCH) in the theater of operations. 
Since this equipment was not assigned to any European unit, the TRANSCOM was 
forced to draw this equipment from CEGE and ship it to their designated locations. Once 
arriving, the 37th was required to assemble the RTCH and prepare it for use. However, 
there was also a shortage of RTCH operators, so the 37th was forced to deploy a team of 
RTCH instructors from the Transportation School at Ft. Eustis, Virginia. 
Although the 37th TRANSCOM is essentially a truck transportation 
brigade, it is easy to see why additional missions were assigned to them. The 37th is a 
"transportation" unit, and no other force structure existed in Germany to support those 
additional missions. Those missions would challenge the limits of the 37th TRANSCOM, 
but through diligence and determination, all the missions were successfully 
accomplished. 
c. Movement Control Structure 
As the theater's movement control agency, 1st TMCA was responsible for 
coordinating and arranging common user land transportation, contracting for 
transportation support and providing force tracking during deployment. As an ALO-8 
organization, the 1st TMCA was at 35% of its full time manning, resulting in difficulties 
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with becoming mission capable for an operation of this magnitude. The inadequate 
manning level left the TMCA critically short of MCTs and trained STACCS personnel, 
and there were no Reserve Component (RC) personnel augmenting the unit during the 
first several weeks of the deployment. The PSRC occurred on 8 December 1995 and two 
RC MCTs in Italy were activated on 11 December. However, the active duty staff 
shouldered a tremendous burden that only improved once the RC augmentation arrived. 
The surprising aspect of this whole situation is that there are no RC MCTs in the 7th 
Army Reserve Command (ARCOM), which is responsible for all RC units stationed in 
Europe. 
Another movement control area that suffered during the deployment was 
that of movement control and transportation system knowledge. One of the first units to 
deploy from Wiesbaden was the 27th Transportation Battalion, which was the V Corps 
Movement Control Center (CMCC), and one of only two active duty Movement Control 
Battalions in Germany, the other being the 39th Transportation Battalion, which was 
subordinate to the 1st TMCA. Once the 27th Transportation Battalion, with their two 
subordinate MCTs, the 15th and 30th, deployed, the entire function of movement control 
support for the two active duty divisions in Germany was suddenly thrust upon the 
TMCA. This, coupled with the deployment and TMCA's personnel shortage, left a 
gaping void in the movement control capabilities of the theater. 
2.        Plans and Preparation 
USAREUR faced many challenges during the planning of Operation Joint 
Endeavor. Some of the difficulties have already been discussed in Chapter 2, but warrant 
amplification because of the impact that they had on the execution of the operation. 
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These difficulties included the uncertain political environment surrounding the peace 
talks, the information flow between headquarters and the compressed time line that 
forced the planning staff into crisis action planning. 
The other major problem encountered during the planning phase was the inability 
to conduct reconnaissance in the AOR. This would limit the information available to 
planners, and would affect decisions made about onward movement routes, base camp 
locations and infrastructure conditions. Units did not even become aware of these 
problems until after the deployment had started and someone was physically on the 
ground. In one instance, the planned route for the onward movement convoy from 
Hungary to Croatia had to be changed because a bridge on the route was not capable of 
handling the weight of a HET carrying an Ml Al tank. So the route had to be changed at 
the last minute. Fortunately another route was found and no backlog developed during 
the onward movement phase of RSOI. The second problem was with base camp 
locations and will be discussed under TAA/Bosnia issues. Finally, the infrastructure in 
these countries was severely limited. Very little paved area for parking vehicles, very 
poor roads, poor railheads and inadequate phone and power lines were all problems that 
could have been identified and solved early, but because there were no recons done until 
late in the planning, many of these problems had to be solved during execution. 
a. TPFDD 
On 4 December 1995, EUCOM issued an execution order to USAREUR 
stating that the JOPES would be used so that the JCS could monitor the deployment 
(Akard, 1997). JOPES is a strategic automated deployment system that serves as a global 
command and control system, a strategic force tracking system, and a management tool. 
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A valid JOPES TPFDD is the baseline to effectively coordinate, manage, direct, and 
execute deployment. However, the use of JOPES presented a problem for some key 
commanders in Operation Joint Endeavor, including LTG Abrams of V Corps and MG 
Wright of the 21st TAACOM. These commanders felt that since the deployment was 
over land and that no strategic air or sealift was being used; the deployment to Bosnia 
was an operational deployment and not a strategic one (U.S. Peacekeeping Institute, 
1996). Therefore, using JOPES was believed to be inefficient for planning this 
deployment. 
In addition, USAREUR had conducted two deployment exercises and 
practiced the use of STACCS, not JOPES, as its primary means of tracking and 
controlling the deployment. Because of this training, the USAREUR, 21st TAACOM and 
1st TMCA commanders were committed to the use of STACCS. STACCS is essentially a 
stand-alone, operational system for theater level command and control. Because of that 
limitation, this system would not provide the deployment visibility that the JCS desired. 
There were many other factors that contributed to the resistance to use 
JOPES. The first was that STACCS did not mesh well with JOPES, due to the inability 
to upload data automatically from STACCS to JOPES. Second, JOPES worked well for 
deliberate planning and strategic movements, but was less useful when other than 
strategic lift was used. Along those same lines, JOPES also did not seem to have the 
flexibility to adjust the operational plan based on deployment capacity or throughput 
variables. In the case of OJE, so many environmental and operational changes occurred 
that our entire deployment plan had to be revised in execution. The third factor causing 
resistance was that the TC-ACCIS, which feeds level four data into JOPES for the 
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creation of the TPFDD, was not used for this deployment (Sundin Interview, 1996). TC- 
ACCIS was not used because it was very time-consuming to enter the level four data into 
the system, and due to the compressed time lines, the TAACOM determined that the use 
of TC-ACCIS was not practical. Therefore, it was nearly impossible for JOPES to 
produce an accurate TPFDD for deployment. In fact, when the deployment started, there 
was no validated TPFDD with which to execute the deployment. 
What did exist at the beginning of the deployment was an incomplete 
TPFDD and the TMCA movement plan, which was constructed in the form of a 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet called TMCA.XLS (Hansen Interview, 1996). This was 
primarily for tracking the rail deployment and was built using level four data taken off 
the STANAGs. However, as more changes crept into the deployment, the TMCA 
spreadsheet became no more useful than the incomplete TPFDD. Once these documents 
became unusable, the deployment was in chaos, causing backlogs at railheads in 
Germany and Hungary. There was no accurate movement priority, and units were rail 
loaded and deployed based on their missions. This situation occurred from the time that 
USAREUR was notified until the time the first forces flowed into Hungary to establish a 
support base and then the initial entry forces, to include the bridging operations. 
Transportation assets, particularly air assets, were being wasted, because 
USTRANSCOM was not in the planning loop, because there was no accurate TPFDD. 
Because JOPES was not used, USTRANSCOM could not allocate airlift needs against 
valid requirements. The whole system was not working and needed to be fixed 
immediately. 
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By the time another execution order was issued on 14 December 1995 by 
EUCOM, USAREUR had attempted to take control of the problem. The TPFDD had 
been built, but not in accordance with doctrine. Rather, the TPFDD was built by multiple 
manual entries of data at different locations and by the efforts of Mr. Bernie Oliphant 
who has essentially developed the TPFDD from scratch (Sundin Interview, 1996). That 
TPFDD was used to schedule buses, commercial moves, airlift, rail and convoys, so it 
was quite comprehensive. 
At the same time, the USAREUR Movement Board (UMB) was formed to 
give USAREUR a deployment management capability. Operating at USAREUR 
Headquarters, the UMB identified and resolved deployment priorities, problems, and 
issues. Daily coordination with USEUCOM, USAREUR (Forward), and the USAREUR 
deployment community centralized deployment management. These changes improved 
USAREUR's capability to manage and execute the deployment (USAREUR AAR 
Volume 1,1997, p. 172). 
b. Unit Movement/Deployment Training 
Although USAREUR conducted two deployment exercises, those 
exercises were focused on staff processes for the deployment. One of the most basic 
aspects of a deployment would haunt USAREUR and it was due to a lack of training. 
Rail loading was a challenge for many units deploying because of their 
unfamiliarity with rail loading procedures. V Corps units had extensive experience with 
rail loading of tracked vehicles, because that was the normal method for transporting 
armored fighting vehicles from home stations to exercise areas. A unit's wheeled 
vehicles, however, normally convoyed from home station.    Therefore, while units 
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understood how to load tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFV), they had little or no 
experience with the correct procedures for loading and tying down wheeled vehicles. 
Unfortunately, some units did not know they lacked the proficiency until they arrived at 
the railhead. By that time it was too late. 
Additional problems were encountered by some medical and signal units, 
which did not have significant experience with deploying. USAREUR Regulations 
require that each unit have a trained unit movement officer (UMO), which is normally an 
additional duty for a lieutenant in a unit. Because of competing demands with other 
additional duties and a traditional lack of deployments, many UMOs neglected their 
company's unit movement plans. Plus, units were focused on other training like mine 
awareness and preventing cold weather injuries, so that again, the rail loading training 
suffered. The lack of adequate movement plans was demonstrated in the first deployment 
exercise, DEPLOYEX, and had improved by DEPEX II; however, the basics of tying 
down a vehicle on a rail car had still not been practiced. 
As previously mentioned, USAREUR used forms prescribed under 
STANAGs to request rail cars for train movements and most units with tracked vehicles 
were familiar with how to fill out a STANAG form and what information is required. 
However, with the deployment to Operation Joint Endeavor, units that had never seen a 
STANAG form were suddenly required to fill one out. This led to many problems 
including units submitting the form with the destination marked "unknown." In addition, 
since Germany uses the metric system, measurements submitted on the STANAG form 
must be in metric measurements. However, since units had never received training on 
how to properly fill out a STANAG form, measurements were submitted in feet, inches 
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and short tons. In this situation, with a shortage of rail cars and weight restrictions in the 
Czech Republic and Hungary, lack of accurate information caused problems (Schneider 
Interview, 1996). 
ASGs and BSBs, acting as "power projection units," were able to alleviate 
some of the problems caused by lack of rail training. In most BSBs, the team at the 
railhead would load and tie down a train, however, there was no Standard Operating 
Procedure (SOP) established to dictate how a BSB ran their railhead. Therefore, different 
BSBs conducted railhead operations differently, resulting in some railheads where units 
were required to tie down their vehicles and that was where the difficulties arose. 
3. Deployment Execution 
Although SHAPE, AFSOUTH, ARRC, EUCOM, USAREUR and V Corps 
Headquarters had all been planning for a deployment to Bosnia, not one of the upper- 
level headquarters had put together an adequate deployment system (Bryant Interview, 
1996). Because of this fact, all of these headquarters had to attempt to synchronize their 
deployments during execution, which is hardly desirable. The problems with the 
execution of the deployment began as soon as the peace agreement was initialed in Ohio 
in November 1995. 
When the GFAP was initialed on 21 November 1995, planners tentatively 
established G, C and D-Days. G-Day was set for 16 December, D-Day (the day IFOR 
would assume the mission from UNPROFOR) would be 20 December, and because 
NATO's enabling force needed fourteen days to deploy and USAREUR's RSOI force 
needed fourteen days to establish the ISB, C-Day would be fourteen days before G-Day, 
or 2 December.   On 27 November, CINCUSAREUR authorized ordering trains, even 
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though it was potentially expensive to order trains and not use them, so that trains would 
be available on C-Day. On 29 November, USAREUR and its MSCs had a deployment 
conference to establish priorities for movement within each force package. Also at 
approximately the same time, the TMCA Movement Control Cell in Kaiserslautern had 
waded through the thousands of STANAGs that had been received and had constructed a 
comprehensive movement plan. This plan, along with the deployment priorities 
established, was essentially null and void once the peace agreement was signed. 
Even though C-Day was supposed to be the day that USAREUR commenced its 
deployment, EUCOM and USAREUR could not issue deployment execution orders until 
they received authorization from political authorities. These orders finally came on 7 
December, in essence compressing the fourteen-day enabling force deployment and 
RSOI establishment to seven days. This compression of the deployment meant that 
critical elements of the LOC-opening package and the RSOI package would not be 
operational when TFE units began deploying through the ISB and to SA Harmon. This 
support shortfall was exacerbated following the signing of the peace treaty, which 
resulted in the operational decision to push TF Eagle forces forward in the flow. 
Strategic ambiguity plagued the operation from the start. It did not become clear 
until the actual signing of the peace agreement what types of forces would be needed to 
accomplish the mission. When the peace agreement called for the immediate entry of a 
sizeable combat force into Bosnia, deployment plans had to be reconfigured. As in 
previous intervention operations, this change deferred the planned movement of the 
essential logistics support personnel to the theater of operations, disrupting deployment 
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activities and once again, all the preparation notwithstanding, creating a logistics shortfall 
which took considerable time to correct (CALL OJE Initial Impressions, 1996, p. 9). 
The main problem that developed was a result of the requirement for TFE to 
enforce the ZOS by D+30. Based on the planned flow, USAREUR realized that TFE 
would not be able to meet that requirement. Therefore, the initial entry force, the LOC- 
opening force and the RSOI force deployed simultaneously instead of sequentially as 
originally planned. Moving critical enabling and RSOI package units to later deployment 
dates compensated for changes to the deployment flow. As a result, by G-Day, less than 
50% of the enabling force was in place and only 50% of the required RSOI force was in 
place (USAREUR AAR Volume I, 1997, p. 171). This caused insufficient support 
capability in both the ISB and SA Harmon. 
USAREUR determined that one other event needed to occur before Task Force 
Eagle could occupy the ZOS by D+30. USAREUR believed that the bridge must be in 
place not later than 22 December instead of the original plan of having the bridge in place 
by 31 December. Because of this determination, more units involved in the bridging 
operation, the 535th Combat Support Company (CSC), more of the 16th Engineers, and 
the 501st FSB, which was providing some maintenance support, were pushed forward in 
the flow (Hansen Interview, 1996). And although the original plan had been to deploy 
everything through the ISB, these units were deployed directly into Croatia. This caused 
severe congestion and support problems in the TAA. In order to help with the problems 
at Harmon, the 16th Corps Support Group was diverted from the ISB to Slavonski Brod 
and helped to clear some of the backlog in Croatia. However, because a limited reception 
capability now existed in Slavonski Brod, USAREUR tried to play catch up by adding 
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additional trains, bypassing the ISB and going directly into Slavonski Brod. This 
overwhelmed the small railheads in Croatia and resulted in a larger backlog of trains. 
Although the push to get the bridge in the water by 22 December could have been 
successful, all the necessary units were not in place by that time. Because of the risk 
involved with the operation and because a significant number of TFE forces were still in 
the deployment backlog at the ISB, the bridge date was moved back. Ultimately, the 
bridge was completed on 31 December 1995, as originally scheduled. However, because 
of the significant changes to the deployment sequence, movement was disrupted for the 
first three weeks of the deployment. 
The rail movements into Croatia caused another problem in that no material 
handling equipment (MHE) had flowed into the theater yet. Because of this, the 21st 
TAACOM quickly upgraded the already scheduled RTCHs and was able to have a RTCH 
delivered to Croatia in only five days. In the meantime, units used every technique 
possible to offload equipment, including using an M88 tank recovery vehicle as a 
makeshift crane. 
There were a number of unforeseen problems early in the rail deployment, 
incidents that were beyond the control of the deploying forces, but that caused 
deployment delays nonetheless. One incident occurred in Hanau, Germany where a 
German anti-nuclear group decided that the beginning of December was a perfect time to 
protest a shipment of nuclear fuel elsewhere in Germany. The group managed to short 
out the main switching yards in Hanau, which stopped deployment trains for 48-hours 
(Bryant Interview, 1996). Another problem that arose was a rail strike in France that 
trapped 125 of 250 deep well rail cars (Schneider Interview, 1996). Since these cars were 
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required for movement of oversize loads, many of these pieces were removed from the 
rail plan and waited for another mode, either commercial or military truck to move the 
piece to the ISB. 
These problems, coupled with the winter weather throughout the Balkans and 
significant rail backlogs, caused USAREUR to fall three days behind in their rail 
movement. Therefore, on 24 December 1995, LTG Abrams ordered a halt in all rail 
movement in order to realign the flow and clear the backlogs (V Corps AAR, 1997). 
At around the same time, LTG Abrams wanted to begin using more air movement 
than originally planned. As mentioned, USAREUR had access to theater airlift in the 
form of C-130s provided by United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE). However, the C- 
130 could not accommodate some of the vehicles that LTG Abrams wanted to move. A 
decision was made to surge air movement for a couple of heavy companies with Bradley 
Fighting Vehicles, directly into Tuzla, and to move in other brigades, the second echelon 
brigades, principally signal, military intelligence, military police by air (Bryant Interview, 
1996). However, this could not be done by C-130, so to assist, USTRANSCOM placed 
eleven C-17s under the operational control of EUCOM (Akard, 1997). As the weather 
allowed, EUCOM used all available aircraft and surged these units in. The whole 18th 
Military Police Brigade was flown in plus many of the military intelligence and signal 
assets and the entire division tactical operations center (TOC) (Hansen Interview, 1996). 
The C-17 was one of the heroes of this operation, and gave the Army a capability it had 
not had before, to airlift as quickly as this. The Air Force could get the C-17 in, turn it 
around quickly, and get it back for another trip.   In addition, the C-17, which has a 
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capacity slightly smaller than the C-5, could go directly into Tuzla airfield, which the C-5 
could not. 
However, the increased use of strategic airlift caused two problems: 1) it 
necessitated the opening of a second APOE at Rhein Main (formerly only an APOD) and 
required additional Air Force and Army movement control capability and 2) it forced 
inefficient application of the process for validating movement requirements and 
scheduling strategic airlift against those requirements (USAREUR AAR Volume I, 1997, 
p.171). In the first case, the use of airlift meant the formation of an air terminal MCT for 
marshaling and chalking vehicles and in the second case, it resulted in lower payloads 
being moved until adequate application of the process began. However, the additional 
flexibility and speed created by using strategic lift compensated for the changes that it 
caused. 
Over a period from about 29-30 December until 10 January, USAREUR was able 
to catch up. Strategic lift enabled USAREUR to deploy critical requirements into B-H in 
a timely manner to include the first delivery of an armored vehicle launched bridge 
(AVLB) by a C-17. During that time, the use of convoys increased, although that was 
originally discouraged for safety reasons because of the long convoy movement on 
snowy roads. USAREUR had to use both road and air more than initially planned, to 
supplement rail. There was also a significant increase in the number of commercial 
trucks used to move cargo during this time. The majority of cargo moved by commercial 
assets was from railheads where there was some mismatch between the type of cargo and 
the type of railcar, causing the cargo not to be loaded. 
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Other problems developed during the execution of the deployment. The call 
forward process also broke down resulting in numerous headquarters from Headquarters, 
USAREUR down to the lowest level initiating calls forward using several channels 
including operational, logistical, and transportation. The result was a backlog of units at 
railheads throughout Germany. Units deploying by air would go to Rhein-Main Air Base 
instead of Ramstein Air Base, causing them to lose a day in the flow. However, these 
other problems were minor in scope to the problems encountered at the outset of the 
deployment. 
B.        MOVEMENT ISSUES 
As seen in the previous section, the execution of the deployment was very 
difficult because of the provisions of the GFAP and the compressed timeline under which 
USAREUR was operating. Because of that several key aspects of the deployment 
experienced difficulties during the deployment. In the following three sections, the thesis 
will describe some of the problems encountered. 
1.        Modes 
The three primary modes for deploying the force to Operation Joint Endeavor 
were rail, air and surface moves. Each of these modes experienced some sort of problem 
during the deployment window. While each of these problems was significant, they were 
all solved in order to ensure a successful deployment 
a.        Rail 
Because the plan for the deployment in support of Operation Joint 
Endeavor relied so heavily on the use of the European rail system, the majority of the 
difficulties that arose during the deployment were related to rail movement.    The 
problems ranged from the shortage of railcars to the unknowns of the countries the trains 
82 
would travel through. There were also many unforeseen events relating to the rail 
movement that were out of USAREUR's control. The next several paragraphs deal with 
these issues. 
There was a shortage of three types of railcars within the German rail 
system. The first shortage existed in dining cars, which were planned for by USAREUR, 
but were unavailable throughout the deployment. Because of this shortage, soldiers 
accompanying the train were forced to subsist on meals, ready to eat (MRE) and bottled 
water during the four-day trip to the ISB. Sleeping cars were requested for every train, 
however, they were also in short supply and therefore required USAREUR to frequently 
use coaches, which are less comfortable. In a case when a sleeping car was available, 
USAREUR could not count on using that car throughout the operation. This was because 
the sleeping cars were rotated through the system, which meant that after using a sleeping 
car, it would be ten to twelve days before it could be used again (Schneider Interview, 
1996). The final area of shortage was the TWA cars used for carrying oversize and 
outsize equipment. The French rail strike was the main cause of this shortage, but the DB 
got cars from Switzerland, France, Hungary and Denmark to fill some ofthat void. 
However, even with these additional rail cars, units could not give 
adequate advanced notice that these cars were necessary. Therefore, units would show 
up at railheads with oversize or outsize equipment and would end up leaving their 
equipment at the railhead because they had not given the DB sufficient time to obtain a 
TWA car. One specific incident involved the Main Support Battalion for the 1st Armored 
Division. The battalion had a Class II van, with all the unit's clothing, boots, gloves, TA- 
50 items, etc., which was an oversized piece of equipment.   When they arrived at the 
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railhead, there were no deep well cars to accommodate that van, so the unit had to leave it 
at the railhead until it could be pulled to Hungary either commercially or by military 
lowboy trailer (Sundin Interview, 1996). 
Other rail issues sprang from the time frame of the deployment. In 
Germany, their Christmas season starts early in December, which meant that many DB 
employees already had their leaves approved, causing worker shortages. In addition, 
because the DB had privatized in the early 1990s, many of the redundancies of a 
government-owned system no longer existed. Several of the railheads on U.S. 
installations were no longer manned, which created delays in ramp activation and BSB 
interface with rail personnel at certain railheads. Manning problems in the DB would 
take almost two weeks to solve. 
Problems also arose with the number of railcars that the DB was able to 
provide at the beginning of the deployment. Army planners did not anticipate the amount 
of pressure being put on the German railroad. There were thirteen railheads operating at 
the same time during the first days of the deployment. Units were requesting a large 
number of rail cars and because the time line had been compressed, short notice requests 
were the norm. During the first two weeks of the deployment, transportation requests 
were usually not validated until the day prior to the move. This really stretched the 
Bundesbahn thin, as they apparently did not have the number of cars available to react to 
the volume of cars requested and the short notice with which they were requested. 
Train scheduling by the DB also created some problems. Because military 
trains traditionally have a low priority, they had to compete with regularly scheduled 
Euro-City and Inter-City trains.   In some locations, where the congestion is high, it is 
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difficult to push a large number of military trains through. Unfortunately for USAREUR, 
many of the units were located with congested areas in their deployment path. In 
addition, many BSBs were dependent on when empty cars could be staged as to how 
many trains they could load in a day. In Wiesbaden, railcars were spotted at 0700 and 
therefore, two trains per day could be loaded (Sundin Interview, 1996), whereas in 
Darmstadt, railcars were spotted no earlier than 1000 resulting in only one train per day 
(Schneider Interview, 1996). 
The deployment time frame also caused problems in another way. 
December in Europe usually means ice and snow, which caused delays in trains. This 
was particularly true in Hungary and Croatia, where they were experiencing their worst 
winter in over 40 years. The weather not only affected the trains' transit, but also the 
train's loading and unloading. It served to lengthen the total amount of time it took to 
deploy a unit. 
An issue that arose during the loading process at the railhead served to 
frustrate some rail loading operations, especially the first several times it occurred. The 
problem was that different wagonmeisters, the train masters in Germany, had different 
standards for securing vehicles on railcars. The differences were not significant, but 
there were certain nuances between wagonmeisters. The first time this situation arose, a 
unit had partially loaded and secured a train at the end of a day and then broke to finish 
the train the next day. When the unit arrived the next morning, a different wagonmeister 
was at the railhead. He was looking at the train and instructing BSB personnel to redo a 
significant portion of the tiedowns on the train. After that, the BSB and the unit would 
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tie down a single vehicle and then show the wagonmeister to get his approval.   That 
alleviated any future problems with differences between wagonmeisters. 
Finally, USAREUR was deploying by rail into an unknown area. This 
was one of the main reasons for congestion in the ISB. USAREUR thought it would only 
take two days to get to Hungary, so they continued to load and send trains under that 
assumption. Because the actual transit time was more like four days, there ended up 
being more trains in the system than it could handle. That situation resulted in backlogs 
in Hungary and stabling of trains in various locations in Hungary and Austria. 
In addition, the tracks and engines in Eastern Europe are much like the 
tracks and engines were in Germany 60 years ago. Because of this, there was a limitation 
placed on the length and weight of trains going through the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
into Hungary. Trains were limited to 450 meters in length and 1300 metric tons. There 
were certain limitations in the profile also, because of tunnels and low overpasses in 
Eastern Europe that were unknown in the West. In addition, the ramps and facilities at 
railheads in Eastern Europe, particularly Hungary and Croatia, had unknown capacities 
and were in various states of disrepair. Because U.S. commanders were unable to 
conduct reconnaissance early in the planning process, these problems remained 
essentially unsolved until the first units rolled into the ISB and TAA in early December. 
b.        Air 
When the deployment lagged in mid-December, LTG Abrams asked 
EUCOM if there was any way to surge airlift in order to make up for the rail backlog. 
Although the answer was yes, LTG Abrams was told that it would have to be done with 
C-130s, which were the only aircraft that was available to EUCOM through USAFE. 
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EUCOM, however, also told the USAREUR Commander that it would coordinate with 
USTRANSCOM to see if it could get support from strategic assets also. Early on, 
Ramstein Air Base's 86th Airlift Wing was flying the bulk of the missions, with the 
support of twelve C-130s from the 314th Airlift Wing from Little Rock, Arkansas (Arana- 
Barradas, 1995). 
The major nemesis to deploying troops and cargo by air was the weather. 
The weather in Bosnia and Hungary during early December was atrocious. Snow, 
freezing rain and fog caused flights to be cancelled or to return to their origin when 
conditions did not permit a landing in Taszar, Hungary or Tuzla, Bosnia. Only half of the 
wing's twelve daily flights on 12-14 December 1995 were able to land in Tuzla, the 
others had to return to Ramstein. In addition, all flights into Bosnia on 15 December 
were cancelled (Arana-Barradas, 1995). When the use of strategic airlift was initiated in 
late December, the C-17 aircraft involved in the mission could not use Taszar Airfield 
because there was no capability there to support an instrument landing. Once the Air 
Force installed that capability at Taszar, there was a lag of five days before the C-17 
could use the field. This was because the Federal Aviation Administration officials sent 
to certify the instrumentation could not land at Taszar because of fog (Bryant Interview, 
1996). 
The weather effects were also evident at Rhein-Main Air Base. Critical 
personnel from the 3rd COSCOM Headquarters and the 27th Transportation Battalion had 
been ready to load onto railcars on 14 December when they were told that their train 
would not be departing because of the backlog of trains in Hungary. Because the troops 
were vital to the establishment of the ISB, they were loaded into military vehicles and 
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taken to Rhein-Main for a possible flight to Taszar. Weather delays hit and the earliest 
that the troops were able to depart was 17 December. The C-141 carrying the soldiers 
departed enroute to Taszar, but because of weather was diverted to Budapest. After 
staying in Budapest for several hours, the aircraft returned to Rhein-Main to await 
another window to fly to Hungary (Bongioanni, 1995). 
Another problem with using aircraft during the deployment was that 
tactical units were generally unfamiliar with how to load military aircraft. This fact did 
not surprise anyone, however, since very few V Corps units had ever been deployed 
using aircraft. 
c.        Surface 
Although military convoys from Germany to Hungary for the purposes of 
deployment were generally eliminated as a course of action early in the planning process, 
no one anticipated the huge backlogs of equipment during the initial days of the 
deployment. Because of this, deployment by convoy was reconsidered as a means to get 
units essential to ISB operations, but pushed back in the flow in favor of combat units, 
into the ISB. This held particularly true for transportation units because they were 
supposedly the "best" at convoy operations. However, even though they were experts at 
military convoys, these transporters did encounter some problems during their 1,000 
kilometer, three-day drive to Hungary. 
As with air, the biggest threat to the convoy was the weather. Freezing 
rain during the day meant limited visibility and translated into icy roads as the end of the 
day neared. Fog and snow also hindered visibility and forced convoys to stop or 
significantly reduce their speed.  All of these things made the convoy a treacherous and 
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stressful trip, even for the most veteran drivers. Military police patrolling the routes 
determined daily "road conditions" and if the roads were Red or Black, convoys could 
not move military assets into the AOR. 
Soldier support and equipment maintenance support was extremely 
difficult during the movement, especially considering the distance and conditions. Units 
were required to support the convoys internally until two convoy support centers were 
established to assist deployment and resupply convoys. The two CSCs undoubtedly 
enhanced safety by allowing the vehicle operators breaks in their driving, as well as a 
spot to do maintenance and vehicle repair. 
2.        Transit Clearances 
From the U.S. perspective, Operation Joint Endeavor involved a significant level 
of coordination with other sovereign nations in order to deploy our substantial military 
forces and equipment. This included negotiations with at least five non-NATO countries, 
including Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Switzerland, for 
requirements such as transit clearances, basing rights, real estate agreements, logistical 
support arrangements and SOFAs. These negotiations were necessary to obtain 
permission to move by rail and highway through these countries, to establish convoy 
support centers on their soil, to support soldiers on trains during halts, and also determine 
reporting requirements for cargo carried by commercial carriers. 
Normally, the State Department, NATO or EUCOM coordinates for these types 
of agreements. In this case, both EUCOM and USAREUR assumed that NATO would 
be handling transit rights agreements. However, during OJE, a lack of clarity regarding 
what actions would be accomplished by which headquarters and the compressed time 
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frames resulting from delays in political decision-making forced USAREUR to become 
involved in direct international negotiations (V Corps AAR, 1997). This proved to be 
especially difficult since some of the nations in the region would not authorize the 
necessary waivers for movement until the UN acted. Since no one had completed 
negotiations regarding transit clearances, USAREUR, acting on General Crouch's 
guidance and starting on 4 December 1995, contacted the required U.S. embassies. 
USAREUR managed to negotiate interim bilateral transit agreements, which came into 
force on 7 December, with most completed by 9 December 1995. In most cases, 
agreements were established prior to the deployment; however, one notable exception 
was that of Austria, which did not authorize rail movement until about 13 December 
1995 (USAREUR AAR Volume II, 1997, p. 157). 
Other areas of concern arose during the deployment as well. One of these was 
vehicle tie down procedures during the deployment and was highlighted when the first 
trains of U.S. equipment crossed into the Czech Republic. It was discovered that tie 
down procedures are different in Eastern Europe. In Germany, for wheeled vehicles, 
normally only chock blocks are used to secure the vehicle. When the trains moved into 
the Czech Republic and loads began to shift, Czech railroad officials refused to take 
responsibility for the train until the cargo was secured to their standard. 
In order to combat this problem of conflicting tie down standards, the 1st TMCA 
determined which country along the route had the most stringent vehicle tie down 
requirements, and the USAREUR Commander decided that those were the standards our 
deploying forces would follow. Essentially, this meant that everything would be tied 
down with chains or wire rope and also secured with chock blocks.  While this did not 
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increase in vehicle security, the requirement added significant time to rail loading 
operations. 
Another problem encountered was cost. In Germany, train costs are set by a 
military tariff. However, no tariff existed in the Czech Republic, Austria or Hungary. 
Because of the haste at which the transit rights negotiations occurred, inexperience on the 
part of U.S. commanders and ignorance of transportation capabilities and methods in 
various countries, the U.S. government paid some excessive costs for the deployment. 
One of the more notable examples of this is the $200 per hour charged by the Czech 
Republic for train guards (V Corps AAR, 1997). 
Finally, problems occurred in the first couple of days with commercial carriers 
carrying U.S. cargo to Hungary. None of the governments of the countries being 
transited could decide on exactly what kind of documentation was needed. One 
procedure was established at the beginning of the deployment and then after two weeks, a 
special routing for commercial trucks was established. After that, all commercial trucks 
had to clear everything they were carrying upon entering each nation. This then had to be 
done through the embassy, which proved difficult because communications were scarce 
(Schneider Interview, 1996). This problem was eventually solved, but took almost a 
month before a consistent agreement was in place across all countries transited. 
3. Intransit Visibility 
Based on lessons learned from the deployment to Operation Desert Storm, when 
thousands of containers arrived in Saudi Arabia without proper documentation or 
tracking, the 21st TAACOM intended on using radio frequency (RF) tags, detection 
devices and computer systems to track the movement of items through the system (CALL 
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OJE Initial Impressions, 1996, p. 163). However, during the initial deployment, two main 
problems hindered intransit visibility and therefore prevented achievement of the desired 
visibility in transit. 
The first of the problems was equipment related. First, only one station was set 
up to "load" information onto the devices with the data necessary to track containers and 
supplies. This would prove inadequate to handle the sheer volume the system 
encountered. Second, hardware items known as interrogators, were not available at all 
major intersections along the LOC, making it difficult to track even the containers that 
had RF tags. Finally, the automated manifest system (AMS) used to improve accuracy 
did not arrive in theater until late in the process. Therefore, containers received prior to 
the systems' arrival were not processed (Fontaine, 1997). 
The second issue facing ITV was lack of use for the RF Tag. Approximately 40% 
of the containers that deployed to Bosnia did not have RF tags (Schwind, 1998). 
Although this is a huge shortfall, it was definitely better than the Desert Shield 
deployment. However, it created a relatively large number of unidentified cargo 
containers in the theater. Often, this delayed the delivery of critical parts and eroded 
readiness in Task Force Eagle. This problem was never solved during the deployment 
phase of the operation. 
However, USAREUR saw an opportunity to significantly improve in this area and 
saw the  1st Armored Division redeployment as a perfect opportunity to test their 
improvements.  So in conjunction with the Army's Logistics Integration Agency (LIA), 
USAREUR worked toward a goal of 100% visibility of every container and air pallet 
shipped out of Bosnia. In September 1996, a small team of soldiers under the leadership 
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of 200th TAMMC, set out to tag approximately 2,000 containers that would be involved 
in the redeployment. Tags were "burned" with unit and content information and placed 
on the containers. The group set up at least 20 RF interrogators, which once the OJE 
redeployment began, would track these redeploying containers. The AMS was installed 
in key command and control locations, enabling real-time tracking of the containers. 
This, coupled with the use of the same technology during the deployment of the 1st 
Infantry Division in December 1996, proved that this technology could accomplish what 
it intended to do (Manzagol, 1997). 
Another area of difficulty with intransit visibility was in the communications 
arena. On long convoys, it was impossible for a headquarters element to communicate 
with the convoy commander in the convoy. If the convoy encountered problems, they 
were unable to relay information and requests for assistance back to their supporting 
command. During Operation Joint Endeavor, particularly on the 181st Transportation 
Battalion's self-deployment convoy, some type of devices to communicate with the rear 
would have been extremely useful. However, the 181st was not fielded with a system to 
accomplish that mission until later in the operation, after it had been validated and proven 
by the 37th TRANSCOM. 
The system that was validated and proven by the TRANSCOM was called the 
Defense Transportation Tracking System (DTRACS or DTTS). This satellite tracking 
system was initially employed on 470 of the TRANSCOM's vehicles as a test of its 
feasibility (Manzagol, 1997). The test was resoundingly successful. 
The DTRACS consists of a satellite antenna, transponder and keyboard mounted 
in various locations on the vehicle.   Using the satellite tracking, the unit headquarters, 
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along with movement controllers, could, using an automated map, track the location of a 
convoy.  In addition, drivers were now able to send messages back to the headquarters, 
updating them on the convoy status.   This proved to be very effective and numerous 
success stories resulted from the experiment, including several timely rescues of drivers 
involved in accidents, something that was impossible without the DTRACS. 
C.       INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASE ISSUES 
Placing the intermediate staging base in Kaposvar-Taszar, Hungary was one of 
the success stories of the Operation Joint Endeavor deployment. It provided units with 
one location to stop and prepare for the next stage of the deployment. In the ISB, units 
were subjected to the reception, staging and onward movement (RSO) portion of the 
RSOI process.   Integration was the only RSOI task that was not conducted in the ISB. 
Even though the 29th Support Group performed admirably while conducting RSO 
operations, the unit still encountered problems while performing this mission.    The 
biggest problem was that formal doctrine for RSOI did not exist at the time of the 
deployment. Although that doctrine does exist today, much of what was learned during 
OJE was incorporated into that doctrine. 
1. Reception, Staging and Onward Movement 
a.        Reception 
Many challenges faced the 29th Support Group as they arrived in Hungary 
as the main force deployed to establish and operate the ISB and conduct RSOI 
operations. The first difficulty the unit faced was as a result of the signing of the GFAP 
and subsequent requirement to have a substantial combat force on the ground almost 
immediately.  To accomplish this, USAREUR moved combat units forward in the flow 
and pushed back critical RSOI units. Because of this, the 29th Support Group arrived in 
94 
Taszar only three days before the combat forces began arriving. The 29th was required to 
establish its internal operations while providing external support to deploying units. This 
was difficult to accomplish, especially with the limited communication equipment 
available. 
In addition to the fact that the unit was given only three days to establish 
an operation projected to take fourteen days to establish, the 29th SG was required to do 
this with half the personnel it was supposed to have. Again, the change in priority that 
pushed combat units earlier in the flow, pushed critical RSOI units back. Therefore, the 
RSOI force was facing a compressed time line and a shortage of personnel. Also because 
of the flow changes, it was difficult for the 29th to determine what units were arriving on 
a daily basis. This made it nearly impossible to determine support requirements until the 
unit had actually arrived in the ISB. This lack of visibility also extended to the 
deployment modes as well. 
Rail operations proved to be exceptionally difficult in the ISB, due to 
changing unit priorities, increased flow of combat units and a compressed time line. 
There were only four small railheads in Kaposvar-Taszar, Hungary and offload at these 
railheads was very slow. The cold weather, the shortage of personnel, and shortage of 
material handling equipment led to a backlog of trains waiting to be offloaded. 
We had a traffic jam on the rail, based on offloading capability. When 
you only have one or two ramps available, you can offload only one train 
every four to six hours. And you have more trains coming in. 
Automatically, you create a traffic jam (Schneider Interview, 1996). 
The backlog got to be so bad that around 16 December, with ten cargo-laden trains 
waiting on Hungarian rail lines, that the U.S. ambassador to Hungary gave the military an 
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Ultimatum: unload the trains more quickly or temporarily halt any further trains from 
leaving Germany (Sammon, 1995). The backlog occurred because movement planners 
allocated twenty trains per day out of Germany, originally all scheduled to go to the ISB. 
However, reception capability in the ISB was only six to eight trains per day, and 
backlogged trains were rerouted to Slavonski Brod and Zupanje, Croatia. That decision, 
however, only served to extend the backlog into another country and create further 
problems for units in Croatia. 
One final dilemma that the 29th Support Group faced was how to centrally 
control unit arrival. The problem was that unit equipment and personnel were arriving by 
rail, convoy, air, commercial bus and commercial truck. With all these different modes 
delivering people and equipment to Kaposvar and Taszar, a system had to be in place to 
process and account for arrivals. Initially the coordination between arriving units and the 
29 Support Group was limited, especially if units arrived undetected by some means of 
highway transportation. Normally units arriving by air or rail directly to Taszar were 
linked up with a representative immediately, but units arriving by highway were harder to 
track and predict arrival. This lack of coordination caused units to "wander" around the 
ISB, before finding their ultimate destination. Later, the 29th Support Group would use 
signs throughout the ISB to direct wayward units to the central processing location. 
b.        Staging 
Although staging sounds very basic and simple to accomplish, it involves 
much more than just parking a vehicle in a staging area and awaiting movement. This 
was the phase when the majority of the functions in the ISB took place. Everything from 
direct support maintenance and supply replenishment to personnel processing and 
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movement updates occur during this timeframe.   Because of the myriad of activities 
occurring during the staging phase, many challenges were experienced at that time. 
The 51st Maintenance Battalion played a major role in the staging process 
during Operation Joint Endeavor. The Battalion was responsible for the maintenance of 
all vehicles deploying through the ISB. Vehicle breakdowns were not uncommon, 
especially considering the weather and heavy usage during the deployment. Non-mission 
capable vehicles, often arriving on rail cars, were brought to the staging area for the 51st 
Maintenance Battalion to fix. However, because of the large variety of vehicle types 
deploying, the battalion did not always have the tools or expertise they needed to fix 
something. This was especially true of the new PLS and HETs from the 181st 
Transportation Battalion. In addition, the battalion lacked the facilities to conduct some 
types of maintenance and since it was the middle of winter in the Balkans, vehicle 
maintenance was often very difficult. However, due to the professionalism and pride of 
the maintenance soldiers, the battalion was able to accomplish its support mission and 
keep vehicles rolling to the TAA. 
Another area of difficulty in the staging phase of RSOI was the 
certification of every soldiers' OCIE. Prior to Operation Joint Endeavor, LTG Abrams, 
in order to ensure that all soldiers were adequately protected, issued a mandatory list of 
OCIE items that soldiers had to deploy with. Most of the stocking for these items was 
accomplished in Germany, however, the supply facilities often did not have an item in 
stock and therefore the soldier would deploy without it. This meant that the soldier 
would have to receive the item in Hungary. Because there was no centralized control of 
the OCIE stocks in Germany, the 29th Support Group could not see where extra stocks 
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were located in order to resupply the soldier. However, the soldier had to have all of his 
clothing and equipment in order to deploy and unit commanders could not certify their 
units for onward movement unless every soldier had the proper equipment and clothing. 
Therefore, units were forced to cross-level stocks in order to fill shortages. 
Cross leveling was a short term fix and once the flow settled, large 
amounts of stock were deployed in order to support the OCIE verification process and 
ensure every soldier had their gear. 
c. Onward Movement 
As previously mentioned, the task of onward movement was assigned to V 
Corps' only truck transportation battalion, the 181st Transportation Battalion. For onward 
movement planning, the 29th Support Group, the 27th Transportation Battalion and the 
30th MCT supported the battalion. At the beginning of the deployment, the lines 
between these organizations were not really well defined and the process for requesting 
any onward movement was non-existent. 
There were two main reasons why the process was difficult in the 
beginning, including a compressed time line and the lack of transportation personnel in 
the 29 Support Group headquarters. The compressed time line was a result of the GFAP 
requiring a large combat presence in the area immediately. The force was changed 
several times, which affected the deployment and onward movement of forces. The lack 
of transportation personnel in the 29th Support Group headquarters was a result of Army 
doctrine, which states that the support group would deploy into a mature theater of 
operations. In this operation, that was not the case, so the 29th Support Group established 
an onward movement cell in their headquarters.   Made up of personnel from the 27th 
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Transportation Battalion and the 3rd COSCOM, the onward movement cell interfaced 
with the 30th MCT for convoy requests, the 1st Armored Division for priorities and 
deployed equipment and personnel lists, the 29th Support Group for status of the RSOI 
process and USAREUR (Forward) for the call forward. This ad hoc organization proved 
to be very successful at organizing and coordinating the 25 vehicle convoys that would 
leave the ISB hourly starting at 0400 and lasting until 1100. 
Asset and personnel availability were also always a challenge for the 
supporting transportation units. Because the units were low ALO, they were not 
authorized enough drivers to man every truck assigned to the unit. This problem, helped 
only by the Foreign Service Tour Extensions (FSTE) keeping soldiers scheduled to depart 
Germany, would plague the unit throughout the mission. Drivers were also being tasked 
to provide force protection and other duties in the ISB. This just served to exacerbate the 
problem. In addition, the battalion never really had a chance to establish its operation in 
Hungary because within six hours of the first convoy's arrival, the 27 Movement 
Control Battalion was already tasking the units for support. 
Because USAREUR forced the 181st to self-deploy, vehicle availability 
suffered greatly. New vehicles, immature support systems, a shortage of mechanics and 
the high operations tempo (OPTEMPO) of the deployment caused the unit's already 
tenuous readiness to be adversely affected. During the deployment, the battalion 
operated at between 90% and 95% capacity for approximately 60 days on substandard 
roads in the middle of winter. The vehicles during that time took a beating and the 
mechanics in the battalion worked miracles to keep the fleet moving.   Finally, the 
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addition of extra vehicles not normally assigned to the battalion diverted mechanics' time 
away from our task vehicles. 
2.        Space Allocation 
Although Taszar Air Base had a significant unused runway space, that space was 
quickly claimed by the 29th Support Group in order to conduct its RSOI operations. 
Runways were blocked and became staging areas, freight forwarding areas and 
ammunition storage areas. Paved keyholes, where Hungarian MIG fighters once stood, 
were quickly claimed for maintenance areas and supply and headquarters tents. While 
this was efficient use of space, it left no room to station the huge number of 
transportation assets from the 181st and 28th Transportation Battalions that had deployed 
to Hungary to serve as onward movers for TFE. The 181st Transportation Battalion alone 
brought 48 PLS tractors and trailers, 48 HET tractors and trailers and 60 M931-5 ton 
tractors and 81 M967-5,000 gallon tankers, not to mention 24 additional HETs each from 
the Bravo Companies of the 123rd and 703rd MSBs and 60 M915 tractors and 120 M872- 
40 foot trailers from the 70th Transportation Company, 28th Transportation Battalion 
(Herson, 1996). 
So began the search for real estate in an area that has traditionally faced relatively 
light commercial traffic and where, unlike Germany, the number of large paved areas is 
surprisingly small. Initially, the vehicles were parked alongside the roads leading to the 
tarmac at Taszar Airfield. In this location, they were readily accessible to load staged 
unit vehicles and prepare for departure. However, with the mass amounts of personnel 
and equipment arriving in Taszar around the clock, this solution soon proved inadequate. 
The airfield was becoming too congested.   While the 377th Transportation Company 
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HETs were able to remain at the far end of the airfield, the other companies were forced 
to seek alternate arrangements. 
Finding locations for the other companies proved challenging, but with the 
assistance of contractors from USAREUR (Forward), the battalion headquarters and the 
70th Transportation Company were housed in a municipal bus terminal down the street 
from Kaposvar South. The 515th Transportation Company and their fuel tankers plus part 
of the 51st Transportation Company were staged in an old sugar refinery near the center 
of Kaposvar. A trailer transfer point (TTP) for the 70th Transportation Company's 120 
trailers was established at a farm implement warehouse with a large gravel parking lot 
midway between Taszar and Kaposvar. While these locations were not ideal because the 
battalion's assets were significantly spread out, they were adequate until the battalion 
moved south after the deployment to support the sustainment of TFE. 
Later in the deployment, once a more steady state transportation system was 
reached, the transportation assets from the 28th Transportation Battalion were moved to 
the smaller airfield in Kaposjulak, about five miles west of Kaposvar. 
3. Movement Control 
In the RSOI operation, onward movement is closely linked to movement control. 
During OJE, the MCT was the unit that tasked the transportation companies for trucks, 
coordinated host nation support if necessary, coordinated and issued march credits and 
convoy routes, and tracked the movement of all transportation assets throughout the 
theater. In Operation Joint Endeavor, this mission proved to be especially difficult 
because of all the moving pieces involved in the deployment. 
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The 27 Transportation Battalion was one of the first units to deploy from 
Wiesbaden, departing on 9 December 1995. Immediately upon arrival in Kaposvar, 
Hungary the Battalion established operations and began to track the deployment from 
Germany. This however was a daunting task, especially since the deployment time line 
had been compressed and units were flowing in from 30 different railheads in Germany, 
not to mention two Air Bases and numerous other points of departure. Tracking the 
deployment presented the battalion with many challenges. 
The first and most important challenge the battalion faced was poor 
communications infrastructure in Hungary. This made it difficult to communicate with 
the 1st TMCA in Germany and to track movements into the theater. It was very difficult 
to pass information from one point to another. However, communications became easier 
once signal units began arriving and emplacing Defense Switched Network (DSN) 
capability as well as mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) phones. In addition, a 
computer server was established and soon the battalion was able to communicate via 
email. This turned out to be a significant enhancement in communications. 
Second, the battalion faced a personnel shortage. It was not manned at a level 
where it was able to provide the kind of information that commanders wanted. 
Information such as departure and estimated arrival times was difficult to predict because 
of the uncertainty in the deployment system. Because of this uncertainty, too many 
personnel in the headquarters were involved in searching for specific data points and not 
tracking the overall big picture. This problem was solved with augmentation from two 
reserve component MCTs from Italy and also by stripping transportation officers and 
soldiers from other units and assigning them to the 27th Transportation Battalion. 
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A third difficulty was planning and coordinating for onward movement of 
deploying forces. Essentially, there was no transportation link between the deploying 
units, USAREUR, the 29th Support Group and the 27th Transportation Battalion. This 
caused units to be scheduled for onward movement in a haphazard way. Therefore, an 
onward movement cell was created under the control of 27th Transportation Battalion, 
collocated with the 29th Support Group whose mission was to schedule onward 
movement convoys. The group conducted daily meetings with USAREUR (Forward) 
and the 1st Armored Division to determine priorities and where units stood in the RSOI 
process conducted by the 29th Support Group. This cell proved to be very effective and 
freed personnel from the 27th to do movement tracking while the cell concentrated on 
onward movement. 
Another drain on the battalion's personnel was the requirement for movement 
regulating teams (MRT) to be present for every mode departure and arrival into Hungary. 
The battalion simply was not manned to accomplish this mission. In addition, the 
battalion was required to establish an MRT at Bares, Hungary, which was the border 
crossing location between Hungary and Croatia and one in Slavonski Brod and Zupanje, 
Croatia to support movement control in those areas. Eventually, the battalion was 
deployed to fourteen locations in Hungary, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina and worked 
at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. This stretched the battalion extremely 
thin, however, it was the only way for the battalion to maintain positive control and 
intransit visibility over all rail, barge, air, bus and military and commercial truck 
movements throughout Hungary, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
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Once the deployment was complete, the 27th Transportation Battalion's mission 
became more stable and the major difficulties it dealt with were updating TC-ACCIS so 
that every deployed unit was in the system and could be redeployed using JOPES, 
something that was not done successfully in the deployment. 
D.       TACTICAL ASSEMBLY AREA/BOSNIA ISSUES 
Once a unit had been validated by the RSOI cycle in the ISB and called forward 
for movement to the TAA, the heavy tracked vehicles were loaded onto HETs or M872 
trailers for the long convoy to the TAA. The reason USAREUR did this was that tracked 
vehicles were not allowed to move through Croatia. So these vehicles were loaded on 
dedicated onward movement assets and, along with the unit's administrative vehicles, 
embarked on the twelve-hour convoy from Taszar to Zupanje, Croatia. The convoys 
encountered narrow, substandard roads with soft shoulders and impatient civilian drivers 
weaving in and out of the convoys. Several accidents occurred, but no significant 
damage or loss of life resulted. The transportation units supporting the onward 
movement of TFE dealt with this ordeal on a daily basis for sixty days and were 
extremely happy when the deployment was over and the sustainment phase of the 
operation began. 
1. Container Operations 
In recent years, the Army has focused on the use of containers to deploy supplies 
and equipment during a contingency operation.   USAREUR is no different and during 
Operation Joint Endeavor, its units deployed a mountain of containers.   This caused 
severe problems for the soldiers of the 29th Support Group in Hungary for two reasons: 
(1) no area was set aside for a container yard and (2) no container handling equipment 
was available in theater. The 29th SG in the ISB partially solved their problem by leaving 
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containers loaded on trailers and forwarding them directly to the TAA. This, in turn, 
created a huge challenge for the units in the TAA because again, no space had been 
identified for a container yard and no container handling equipment was available in 
Croatia. 
Because the bridge across the Sava was not completed until 31 December 1995, 
containers began to stack up at TAA Harmon as a continuous flow of units and their 
equipment arrived in Zupanje, site of the bridge crossing. On 26 December, the 51st 
Transportation Company was attached to the 16th Corps Support Group and sent to TAA 
Harmon. The company was staged in an abandoned sugar beet factory with a small 
paved area, which barely accommodated the company's vehicles and a temporary 
container storage site. However, this location was accepted by the chain of command, 
especially since, such as Hungary, there were very few large, paved areas and also 
because of the fear of encountering land mines anywhere that was not paved. 
Somehow, despite not being manned for the job, the 51st Transportation Company 
was tasked with running the container yard, something that normally would be done by a 
cargo handling company, which did not exist in USAREUR. As much as the company 
tried, it could not eliminate the backup of containers. The shortage of MHE exacerbated 
the problem and often forced arriving trucks to leave their trailers in the TAA because it 
would take so long to discharge them. This further compounded the problem and 
increased congestion in the TAA. Soon, the temporary container yard became almost 
unusable because of an inability to readily move or stack containers (Herson, 1997). 
Finally, 21st TAACOM (Forward) and USAREUR (Forward) requested that a RTCH be 
shipped from CEGE stocks to assist with this problem.   However, when the RTCH 
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arrived, it had been disassembled for rail movement and required assembly in order to be 
used. Despite having no experience with this type of equipment the company mechanics 
managed to assemble the RTCH. Then, another fortunate occurrence, the company had 
someone who was actually licensed to operate a RTCH. So with RTCH and operator, the 
company began reorganizing the container yard and reducing the backlog of containers 
and trailers at the TAA. 
This, however, was only a temporary solution and the problem would continue at 
a much smaller level until the bridge was emplaced and the containers could be moved to 
their ultimate location. Another solution that finally helped alleviate the problem was the 
arrival of a cargo handling platoon from the 403rd Transportation Company from Fort 
Bragg, North Carolina. 
2.        Base Camp Construction 
As mentioned earlier, on 31 December 1995, the U.S. Army engineers finally 
succeeded in establishing a pontoon bridge across the Sava River. This was a major 
accomplishment considering the conditions that the soldiers in Zupanje had faced in the 
previous week, most notably the flood that destroyed much of the bridge preparations 
already completed. However, once the bridge was completed and Task Force Eagle 
began crossing that bridge, they would encounter several difficulties that were not 
considered in the original plan. 
The concept for operating in Bosnia had originally been to establish eight base 
camps, each of about 3000 soldiers, for force protection purposes. In addition, some 
areas for base camps were initially identified. However, when Task Force Eagle units 
were finally able to get into those sites, they discovered that a combination of the 
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compartmentalization of the terrain, the bad roads and weather, soil too soft or unstable to 
support establishing a base camp and its heavy vehicles and land mines meant that TFE 
had to disperse the force much more than originally planned (V Corps AAR, 1997). 
Because of this, the requirement grew to 23 base camps and the need arose to get 
those camps built quickly. Because the LOGCAP contractor, Brown and Root Services 
was unable to take on this additional workload, the military had to rely on some of its 
own engineers to assist. Navy Seabees and Air Force Rapid Engineer Deployable, Heavy 
Operational Repair Squadron, Engineer (RED HORSE) were deployed to contribute to 
the building of the TFE base camp infrastructure. This created other problems. 
The first problem was that there was only one bridge across the Sava River, and it 
was being used to carry not only the combat vehicles into Bosnia, but also the tentage and 
construction material for the engineers to construct base camps. The bridge was also the 
only means to deliver necessary supplies to the soldiers who had already crossed the 
bridge and were living in very austere conditions in Bosnia. Every load that went across 
the bridge had to be prioritized and structured. Task Force Eagle could not afford for the 
bridge to be run inefficiently. Fortunately, another float bridge was completed on 17 
January 1996, which lessened the burden of moving equipment and construction material 
into Bosnia. 
The other problem created by the surge in the number of base camps was a 
logistical one and dealt with the increase in the amount of material needed to complete 
the construction. Several measures, including local purchase and establishing a facility in 
Germany to expedite procurement and shipping of materials, lessened the burden. 
However, despite the ability to locally purchase, ultimately 90% of the material for base 
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camp construction came from Central Region.    Ultimately, the base camps were 
completed on 18 March 1996, using over four million board feet of lumber, 75,000 sheets 
of plywood and 350,000 cubic meters of gravel in the process (USAREUR AAR Volume 
1,1997, p. 130). 
E.        SUMMARY 
The units involved in the deployment to Bosnia in support of Operation Joint 
Endeavor encountered many challenges. Those units met the challenges head on and 
developed innovative solutions to alleviate the problems. In addition, the units learned 
several lessons from deployment operations, which were recorded and later used to 
improve the way USAREUR deploys. Chapter IV will discuss those lessons and also the 
improvements made as a result of them. 
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IV.    LESSONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, IMPACT AND 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the issues discussed in Chapter III, this chapter outlines the lessons 
learned from the deployment to Bosnia in support of Operation Joint Endeavor. The 
chapter furthermore offers recommendations for improving future deployment 
operations. Finally, the chapter discusses some of the improvements that have already 
occurred and how those improvements have affected doctrine and subsequent operations. 
A.       TEN IMPORTANT LESSONS LEARNED 
Following are the ten major lessons learned which were from the successes and 
failures of operations during the OJE deployment. 
1. A Robust Transportation Infrastructure is Required for Successful 
Deployment and Onward Movement. 
It became clear early on that transportation was the long pole in the logistician's 
tent during OJE. The critical shortage of transportation companies and movement control 
teams caused by the drawdown in Germany strained the limited assets available in 
theater. The assignment of additional "transportation" missions, outside the scope of 
truck operations, to truck units further strained theater resources. Issuing additional 
equipment to units already struggling to crew and maintain their own MTOE equipment 
further compounded the problem. These conditions placed the transportation community 
in a situation where failure was a likely option and would have been disastrous for the 
mission. 
Recommendation: There are two options available to ensure that a shortage in 
transportation assets is not experienced in future deployments. 
109 
One option is for the unit planning transportation support, in this case US AREUR, 
to ensure that sufficient transportation resources, both truck and movement control are 
available. If sufficient assets do not exist in the theater, then planners must request 
additional assets from either CONUS based active or reserve component units. Also, 
planners must ensure those forces are moved early in the deployment in order to leverage 
them against the shortfall. If the additional units arrive too late, the damage to the 
operation may already have been done. 
The second solution to this problem is to work through V Corps and USAREUR 
Force Management channels in an attempt to activate additional transportation companies 
in Germany. V Corps requires additional HET companies to ensure there is enough lift to 
move the divisions' Ml Al Abrams tanks and the M2A2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles. 
Issuing additional equipment to already existing units is not the solution. V Corps also 
needs a medium truck company with flatbed capability in order to transport containers 
and light wheeled and tracked vehicles. The Force Management channel would also be 
employed in order to change the ALOs of already existing transportation companies and 
also the 1st TMCA. All truck companies in USAREUR should be manned at ALO-1 in 
order to crew and maintain all equipment assigned to the unit. All movement control 
units should be manned at a minimum of ALO-2, but preferably ALO-1. 
Finally, planners should attempt to task units only to perform their assigned 
mission and not expand their mission just because they are "transportation" units. 
These units' function during a deployment is too critical to be manned and 
equipped at any level less than 100%. Making these recommended changes will ensure 
success in future missions. 
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2.        Use of TC-ACCIS and JOPES for TPFDD development is critical to 
deployment flow planning. 
USAREUR proved during the planning phase of Operation Joint Endeavor that 
not using TC-ACCIS and JOPES was a critical mistake. By avoiding TC-ACCIS 
because it was time consuming and not employing JOPES because leaders thought of 
OJE as an operational deployment, USAREUR severely limited their ability to plan and 
execute this deployment. Planners were unable to develop and validate a TPFDD and 
therefore were unable to properly sequence the deployment. The lack of a TPFDD 
caused problems from the very first day of the deployment. In addition, the organizations 
that controlled the strategic assets that eventually "saved" the deployment, such as 
USTRANSCOM, had no visibility over the deployment because of USAREUR's failure 
to use TC-ACCIS and JOPES. 
Recommendation: Although this recommendation seems fairly obvious, it is of 
the utmost importance to the success of future operations. USAREUR must use TC- 
ACCIS and JOPES for every deployment they conduct. 
In addition, USAREUR must establish a comprehensive policy for the use of TC- 
ACCIS and JOPES so that there is no confusion in theater where units go to do TC- 
ACCIS input and how the JOPES process works. Part of this policy must also include 
how changes are made once a TPFDD has been developed. In addition, the policy must 
be rigorously enforced and procedures followed to the letter. 
Finally, USAREUR must ensure that TC-ACCIS and JOPES operators are 
properly trained to input and manipulate data. 
These changes will ensure a properly developed TPFDD and smooth deployment. 
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3.        Integrated planning may result in more communication amongst 
headquarters, especially in a compressed time line. 
As mentioned in Chapter III, much of the planning conducted for Operation Joint 
Endeavor was parallel planning.   Headquarters at the V Corps, USAREUR, EUCOM, 
ARRC, AFSOUTH and SHAPE levels were all planning the same mission, however, 
information flow between and among those headquarters was slow or nonexistent.   It 
seems that there was very little cooperation between headquarters in planning for this 
mission. The only integrated planning that was conducted was between V Corps and the 
21st TAACOM, but even that did not occur until later in the planning stage of the 
operation. 
Recommendation: For future operations of this magnitude, the various 
headquarters should attempt to integrate planning as much as possible. This would 
improve the flow of information and also speed up the process. In the case of OJE, V 
Corps, 21st TAACOM and USAREUR should have integrated their planning efforts more 
and also established liaisons at the EUCOM, ARRC and SHAPE headquarters. This 
would have enabled the higher headquarters to flow information through the liaison to the 
lower-level headquarters and vice versa. In planning for any operation, the more 
information that flows both up and down the chain of command, the better the operation 
plan is. In OJE there was very little information flow and the deployment plan 
disintegrated before it even started. 
Headquarters should also use integrated planning to distribute tasks over a larger 
number of people to lighten individual workloads.  Since there are so many things to do 
prior to a deployment, lessening the burden on staff officers would pay great dividends in 
the long run. 
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4.        ASGs and BSBs did an outstanding job as deployment "launching 
platforms." 
The ASGs and BSBs were one of the bright spots during the deployment. 
Although this was the first time that they were tasked to support a deployment of this 
kind as "launching platforms," they performed admirably. The ASGs and BSBs were 
able to take on some of the deployment responsibilities from the deploying units, thus 
freeing those units to worry about the mission. This is extremely helpful in an era with 
such complex missions as peacekeeping, peace making and peace enforcement. Any 
amount of time that the unit can gain to focus on these missions will pay great dividends 
in the end. However, even though the use of the ASGs and BSBs was successful, it was 
not without problems. Since there was no doctrine on how these units were supposed to 
operate, there were several different standards for their operations. In,addition, the units 
were not properly manned or funded to conduct these operations. 
Recommendation: In order for the ASGs and BSBs to be successful in the 
future, they must be properly funded and manned with additional personnel. Since the 
ASGs are under USAREUR command and control, USAREUR should look at the best 
way for this to occur. USAREUR Force Management should pursue an MTOE change 
for the ASGs in order to provide additional personnel for this mission. USAREUR 
Resource Management should provide additional funding for the ASGs to conduct the 
"launching platform" mission. 
In addition, doctrine for the ASGs and BSBs must be developed and validated. 
The easiest way to validate this doctrine would be to hold deployment exercises and 
move units through an ASG-established site to train on the doctrinal tasks.  This would 
ensure proper execution by the ASGs and BSBs for future deployments. 
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5.        The ISB concept coupled with the RSOI concept is a formula for 
success. 
These two concepts were also bright spots during the deployment to OJE.   The 
decision to establish the ISB in the vicinity of Kaposvar-Taszar, Hungary was based on 
sound transportation principles. The ISB was USAREUR's forward platform to conduct 
RSOI operations on deploying Task Force Eagle units and ensure that the soldiers and 
equipment from those units were prepared to enter the austere environment in Bosnia. 
The units conducting RSOI in the ISB successfully accomplished their deployment 
mission. After the deployment and RSOI, the ISB was the home of the NSE, supporting 
all U.S. troops in the area and acting as the final staging base during the redeployment. 
Again, however, there were problems in the ISB and with the RSOI process, most 
springing from the fact that there was no doctrine to support either of the concepts. 
Recommendation: Since joint and Army doctrine has already been established 
for conducting RSOI operations, USAREUR must incorporate this doctrine into its 
Deployment Regulation. This will ensure that USAREUR units conducting RSOI 
operations in the future will know exactly what the responsibilities are and who has those 
responsibilities. In addition, USAREUR should evaluate the ISB concept as part of their 
future operations and develop an SOP or regulation listing roles, structure, relationships 
and capabilities of the ISB. 
The ISB and RSOI concepts are not just meant for USAREUR units. Any 
deploying organization should use either or both of these concepts. If available, 
deploying units should plan to use an ISB to conduct RSOI operations. Doing so will 
help the deploying unit certify that it is in fact ready to enter the deployment area. 
114 
6.        Intransit visibility and the automation that supports ITV must be 
used throughout the entire deployment. 
Although the 21st TAACOM had been using automatic identification technology 
(AIT) for several years, it was not prevalent during the deployment under Operation Joint 
Endeavor. Upwards of 60% of the containers deployed to Bosnia were not marked or 
tracked through the system. However, because of the efforts of the Logistics Integration 
Agency, the redeployment and subsequent deployments were fully supported by RF tags 
and AMS. This trend must continue to ensure that USAREUR units maintain ITV over 
their deploying equipment and containers. 
Another item not used during the deployment, but used for the redeployment and 
subsequent deployments, was the DTRACS or DTTS. This system enables tracking and 
communication of convoy vehicles when those vehicles are away from home station. It 
is useful for report convoy status or requesting assistance in case of emergency. 
Recommendation: Continue to use RF tags and DTRACS. These technologies 
are vital to the visibility of both equipment and supplies during a deployment. 
USAREUR must continue to fund the purchase and installation of DTRACS in trucks 
throughout Germany. Transportation and military police companies should have priority 
for receiving DTRACs, followed by command and control vehicles in company 
headquarters. This communications device could ultimately save lives during combat 
operations. 
In addition, USAREUR must continue to fund the purchase and use of RF tags 
and interrogators for intransit visibility. USAREUR must proliferate the use of this 
technology to ensure successful tracking of deploying units' cargo. 
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7.        The deployment must be organized to move logistics units early in the 
flow. 
The movement of logistics units early in the flow is a lesson that the Army keeps 
relearning. In Somalia, the TPFDD was developed to deploy logistics forces into the 
theater in order to support the deploying combat forces. However, the TPFDD was 
changed and the combat forces deployed first and had no structure to support them. The 
same was true in the OJE deployment. USAREUR intended on flowing various force 
packages, such the RSOI package and the enabling force package. These were logistics 
type units designed to deploy early in order to establish the infrastructure necessary to 
support the deploying combat force. Since that did not happen during OJE, deploying 
combat forces were greeted with only half of what they were supposed to have seen. 
Because ofthat, the combat forces were ultimately held up in their deployment to wait for 
much needed logistics units to process them. 
Recommendation: Units deploying in the future must build the TPFDD to 
reflect early deployment of logistics forces. Without this, the Army is doomed to repeat 
the failures of Somalia and Bosnia. Deploying units should designate some logistics 
forces as "early deployers" so that those units always know that they will be at the tip of 
the spear during a deployment. 
In addition, those units designated as "early deployers" should train as such. 
They should also receive their full complement of personnel and equipment in order to be 
ready at all times to quickly deploy, if necessary. 
In USAREUR, units like the 29th Support Group and subordinate units from the 
3r  COSCOM could be designated as "early deployers" because of their capability to 
perform the RSOI mission. This would ensure proper support when combat units arrive. 
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8.        The C-17 was extremely valuable to the success of the deployment. 
The Army and to a certain extent the Air Force were pleasantly surprised about 
the performance of the C-17 Globemaster III during the deployment to Operation Joint 
Endeavor. During the 2-week time frame from the end of December 1995 to the middle 
of January 1996, the C-17 saved the deployment time line for USAREUR. USAREUR 
had gotten behind in the deployment and needed assistance. However, this assistance, 
especially in the form of the C-17 almost never materialized. 
This was because the Army did not use the strategic planning tool, JOPES, to 
develop a TPFDD. Therefore, USTRANSCOM and its subordinate, AMC, never had 
visibility over the deployment, or the need for strategic airlift. In addition, 
USTRANSCOM was not involved in the planning process. 
Recommendation: As previously mentioned, USAREUR and any other 
deploying unit must use JOPES to plan their deployment. This will eliminate many of 
the problems that USAREUR experienced during OJE. 
In addition, USAREUR and other deploying units must involve the 
USTRANSCOM Headquarters in the planning for the mission, whether they intend on 
using USTRANSCOM assets or not. This headquarters is a great resource for general 
transportation planning information and their subordinate units, AMC in particular, can 
be extremely useful in assisting the unit headquarters to successfully accomplish their 
deployment mission. 
Finally, by involving USTRANSCOM in the planning process the deploying unit 
alleviates any possible opposition resulting from trying to request USTRANSCOM 
support midway through a deployment. 
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9.        When dealing with deployment, expect the unexpected and have a 
backup plan. 
The deployment to Operation Joint Endeavor was like a case study in Murphy's 
Law.   USAREUR encountered anything and everything that could go wrong in this 
mission.     If USAREUR had developed a comprehensive plan,  including backup 
transportation modes, Murphy's Law would not have affected the deployment so much. 
During the deployment, USAREUR encountered adverse weather, which affected 
rail, convoy and air movements. The French rail strike, the anti-nuclear protests, a 
shortage of rail cars, the holiday season, and compressed time lines all hindered the rail 
movement. A shortage of military trucks and uncertainty over commercial truck 
availability and use impeded the surface movement. A shortage of air and failure to 
include USTRANSCOM in deployment planning affected air movement. The 
recommended solution to that problem follows. 
Recommendation: As the lesson learned says, have a backup plan. This does 
not mean a general idea of what will happen if the original plan fails, but a 
comprehensive plan for each mode and node. A plan such as this could even be built into 
a deployment regulation or SOP, much like the "early deployer" package discussed 
earlier. 
As a backup to shortage of railcars and trucks, perhaps USAREUR could 
establish a "Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)-like" relationship with the DB and other 
European railroads as well as the commercial trucking industry to ensure the supply of 
sufficient rail cars and commercial trucks during a contingency mission. These 
suggestions would result in the Army having the required assets when necessary. 
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10.      Deployment and sustainment operations rely on containers; therefore 
a standard container management system/unit must be established. 
The deployments to Saudi Arabia for Operation Desert Storm and to Bosnia for 
Operation Joint Endeavor have shown that the container will be a major part of the 
Army's deployment landscape. Units use containers to deploy almost anything and 
therefore, containers are of vital importance to the deployment process. However, in 
USAREUR, there is no standard container management SOP or a unit equipped to handle 
containers and manage a container yard. Without this SOP and this unit, USAREUR will 
continue to experience the container debacle that it experienced in Croatia during OJE. 
Since a previous lesson learned already showed that AIT is required to track the 
deployment of containers, this lesson will deal specifically with ways to make container 
operations easier in USAREUR. 
Recommendation:   First, USAREUR needs an SOP that deals with container 
operations during a deployment. This SOP should be incorporated into their Deployment 
Regulation and should assign responsibilities to units for various container functions. 
However, before the SOP can assign responsibilities, USAREUR Force Management 
must request activation of a cargo transfer company in USAREUR. The company could 
be assigned to the 37th Transportation Command for command and control.   A cargo 
transfer company contains the necessary MHE, such as RTCHs and forklifts to handle 
any container.    In addition, part of this company's doctrinal mission is to operate 
container yards.   They also have the capability to operate on airfields and in seaports, 
handling cargo in both locations.    A cargo transfer company would add significant 
capability   and   flexibility   to   USAREUR   deployment   operations   and   increase 
USAREUR's ability to deploy. 
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B.       IMPACT ON SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS 
The deployment to Bosnia and subsequent lessons learned have already had a 
significant impact on deployment operations and doctrine. Much of the impact has been 
felt at the strategic level, but can also be seen at the operational level as well. OJE has 
impacted the way deployment operations were conducted for the deployment to 
Operation Joint Guardian in Kosovo as well as other USAREUR deployments to support 
training and contingency missions. OJE has affected our NATO, joint and Army doctrine 
as well as USAREUR and subordinate unit regulations and policies. The following 
sections will cover a few of the impacts of Operation Joint Endeavor. 
1.        Impact on Operations 
As a result of lessons learned from Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia, then 
Chairman  of the  Joint  Chiefs   of Staff,   General  John  Shalikashvili,  created  the 
Deployment Process Special Action Group (DPSAG) with a twin purpose:   provide a 
joint focus for the services' deployment initiatives and enable the unified commands to 
influence the deployment improvement process directly (Bronson, 2000).  In 1997, this 
organization became known as the Deployment Division in the Directorate for Logistics 
(J4) of the Joint Staff. The Deployment Division serves as the single point of contact for 
all recommendations to improve the joint deployment process. 
a.        Deployment Process 
In late 1997, the Joint Planning and Execution Community determined 
that the Department of Defense (DOD) needed a deployment process owner.   After 
several recommendations and thorough analysis, the Secretary of Defense named the 
Commander in Chief United States Joint Forces Command (CINCUSJFCOM) as the 
deployment process owner on 23 October 1998.   CINCUSJFCOM is now responsible for 
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leading actions to substantially improve the efficiency of deployment-related activities 
(Bronson, 2000). 
In 1999, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested 
CINCUSJFCOM to recommend a time standard for TPFDD development and validation. 
After analyzing data from supported warfighting CINCs, USJFCOM recommended a 72- 
hour standard for TPFDD development and validation, to include level four detail, which 
was approved. 
b.        Deployment A utomation 
Because of problems encountered in Operation Joint Endeavor with the 
various automated systems used for planning and tracking the deployment, the Joint 
Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC) determined that only two automated systems 
would be used in an effort to meet the 72-hour time standard for TPFDD development 
and validation. These two systems, the Transportation Coordinator's Automated 
Information for Movements System II (TC-AIMS II) will be the single-source data 
system and the Joint Force Requirements Generator II (JFRGII) will be the single-source 
feeder system for capturing and feeding unit movement requirements into JOPES 
(Bronson, 2000). These two systems should alleviate the types of problems USAREUR 
faced during OJE. 
On the operational side, USAREUR has continued to increase its use of 
RF tags and AMS. During the 1st Armored Division redeployment from Bosnia and the 
1st Infantry Division deployment to Bosnia, USAREUR units extensively used RF tags, to 
include the 299th Forward Support Battalion (FSB), which became the model for the fully 
automated FSB of the future (Manzagol, 1997). RF tags have been used successfully in 
subsequent rotations  of the  Stabilization Force  (SFOR)  in Bosnia and also  the 
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deployment to Kosovo. Because of these successes, USAREUR has mandated the use of 
these tags for all deployments in the future. In addition, USAREUR has established the 
Deployment Processing Center as the central point for inputting information, "burning," 
into the RF tags for deploying units. 
c. The Deployment Processing Center (DPC) 
While the previous two impacts dealt specifically with deployment from 
the joint and strategic levels, this impact deals specifically with USAREUR deployments. 
Based on lessons learned from the deployment to Bosnia in support of Operation Joint 
Endeavor, USAREUR determined that the theater needed a centralized point for 
processing units for deployment.   This centralized facility, the Deployment Processing 
Center, was created in 1999 when hostilities again flared in the Balkans, this time in 
Kosovo.     It was used extensively throughout the deployment to Kosovo and in 
subsequent deployments in support of Partnership for Peace exercises and operations in 
Turkey, Israel and Saudi Arabia. In addition, use of the DPC has been mandated by the 
new USAREUR Deployment Regulation, USAREUR Regulation (UR) 525-1.    The 
following is an excerpt from the USAREUR Regulation describing the DPC, its location, 
mission, and processes. 
It is located at Rhine Ordnance Barracks (ROB), vicinity Kaiserslautern, 
Germany, and is a force projection platform. It is a turn-key facility used 
to control, stage, and conduct final processing of units (soldiers and their 
equipment) for aerial deployment from the nearby Aerial Port of 
Embarkation (APOE), Ramstein Air Force Base. The DPC has a 
secondary mission of providing life support for deploying or redeploying 
Army units transiting Ramstein Air Force Base. Under contingency 
operations, units will deploy to the DPC after completing all home station 
pre-deployment activities. The DPC, through an eight-stage process, will 
validate the unit's readiness for air deployment as well as assist the unit in 
correcting any shortfalls found. A combined effort between the unit, 
pusher unit and DPC cadre personnel will be utilized to ensure all 
deploying soldiers and equipment meet deployment standards. 
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The DPC is under the command and control of the 21st Theater Support 
Command, known as the 21st TAACOM during OJE, and is manned by personnel from 
the 29th Support Group, the same unit that played the critical role in conducting RSOI 
operations during OJE. The DPC conducts a myriad of activities, including vehicle 
maintenance, hazardous material (HAZMAT) inspections, pallet building, vehicle 
weighing and marking, RF tag "burns," and personnel processing. Thus far, the DPC has 
been very successful in accomplishing its mission and making the deployment process in 
USAREUR run more smoothly. 
2.        Impact on Doctrine 
Operation Joint Endeavor, like many operations before it, has had a tremendous 
impact on the doctrine the Army uses to conduct its operations. The operation has 
affected doctrine not only for the Army, but also for joint operations as well. Probably 
the biggest effect on doctrine is seen in the RSOI arena, but major changes have also 
been made in Europe, where deployment regulations have been completely redone as a 
result of the lessons learned from Operation Joint Endeavor. 
a.        RSOI Doctrine 
During the deployment to Operation Joint Endeavor, no doctrine existed 
for conducting RSOI operations. This need for doctrine prompted the newly established 
Deployment Division in the Directorate of Logistics of the Joint Staff to direct 
publication of Joint Publication (JP) 4-01.8, Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures 
(JTTP) for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI). This 
doctrine was completed and published on 13 June 2000. 
123 
Prior to the joint community publishing their doctrine on RSOI, the Army 
completed and published its RSOI doctrine. On 17 March 1999, the Army published 
Field Manual (FM) 100-17-3 Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration. 
Much of what was accomplished in OJE by the 29th Support Group has been incorporated 
into both the joint and Army RSOI doctrine publications. In additional to these two 
publications, CALL and USAREUR have also published documents dealing with the 
conduct of RSOI operations. 
The RSOI doctrine has been extremely useful to units in USAREUR. The 
Army used RSOI at Camp Able Sentry in Macedonia during the deployment to Kosovo 
in 1999 and have also used RSOI in Exercise Victory Strike in Poland in 2000. 
b.        Deployment Regulations 
As a result of OJE, USAREUR has made major revisions to its 
deployment regulations. As previously mentioned, the new USAREUR deployment 
regulation, UR 525-1 contains many new provisions for conducting deployments. These 
include the use of the DPC, use of RF tags, new procedures for requesting transit 
clearances, the use of TC-ACCIS and JOPES, and the use of ASGs and BSBs as 
"launching platforms" for rail deployment, for example. While the new UR was in its 
final draft as of May 2000, once complete, it will make deploying in USAREUR easier. 
Because of the major changes in the USAREUR deployment regulation, 
each of USAREUR's major subordinate commands has been forced to revise their plans 
as well. V Corps, the major force provider during the deployment, has yet to publish an 
updated deployment regulation although it has produced a draft deployment SOP and 
letter  of instruction  (LOI).     The   3rd  COSCOM  published  their  comprehensive 
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Deployment SOP on 1 January 2001. The 21st TSC and the 1st TMCA are both also in 
the process of updating deployment regulations and SOPs. 
c.        STANAG2173 
During the deployment, USAREUR units relied on UR 55-8, which 
outlined procedures for securing military vehicles to German railcars. Because of the 
difficulties encountered with vehicle tie downs during the deployment, especially when 
moving through other countries, the USAREUR Regulation was rescinded and replaced 
withaNATOSTANAG. 
STANAG 2173 lists methods for securing wheeled and tracked vehicles 
on European railcars. It also outlines procedures that must be followed depending on 
what type of train the equipment is going on, including existing traffic and special trains. 
Finally, the STANAG contains drawings of the proper tie down configurations for the 
most common military equipment shipped by rail in Europe. 
C.       SUMMARY 
Throughout the early 1990s, conditions existed in the former Yugoslavia, 
specifically Bosnia and Herzegovina, to warrant intervention by the United Nations. 
However, the force sent in by the UN, UNPROFOR, failed to successfully accomplish its 
mandate and problems escalated. In 1995, after a series of NATO bombings, the leaders 
of Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia met to discuss a possible peace agreement. In December 
1995, that agreement was signed in Paris and signaled the beginning of Operation Joint 
Endeavor. 
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The deployment phase of Operation Joint Endeavor lasted from 16 December 
1995 until 14 February 1996. In that time, USAREUR moved more than 25,000 soldiers, 
their equipment, their sustainment and their life support more than 1,000 kilometers 
across former Warsaw Pact countries and into the IFOR sector. The deployment endured 
an extreme compression of the deployment timeline, a rail strike in France, an anti- 
nuclear protestor shutting down the German rail system for two days, the worst Balkan 
winter in 40 years, the holiday season, an unseasonal flood of the Sava River, and a 
shortage of personnel and equipment to complete the largest deployment of United States 
military forces since Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1990. 
This deployment would prove to be the largest overland deployment of U.S. 
military forces ever. Over 11,000 pieces of equipment and 160,000 tons of supplies were 
moved in a very short time frame. To accomplish this, USAREUR used 409 trains, 7,340 
rail cars, 507 commercial buses, 1,770 trucks and 1,358 aircraft sorties (Army News 
Service, 1996). 
This operation was a phenomenal consolidation of transportation assets to 
accomplish a difficult mission. Although USAREUR encountered problems during the 
deployment, it used the lessons learned from those difficulties to improve their 
deployment processes and doctrine and ensure the same problems were not encountered 
during subsequent deployments. In addition, the joint deployment community has used 
Operation Joint Endeavor as justification to pursue improvements in the overall 
deployment process. 
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D.       CONCLUSION 
As mentioned, the deployment to Operation Joint Endeavor made history by being 
the largest overland deployment of forces ever. History, however, is valuable only to the 
extent that it can be applied in the present to benefit the future. It is hoped, therefore, that 
military strategists and logisticians will heed the lessons learned from the deployment to 
Bosnia in support of Operation Joint Endeavor to avoid mistakes and repeat successes. 
Indeed, the opportunities to apply these lessons are likely to be more common. One need 
only look to recent events in the Balkans to recognize the significance of the Operation 
Joint Endeavor experience. It remains a convenient model for conducting effective 
deployment operations into a remote, austere environment. 
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